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FOREWORD  
wo important and related perspectives are offered at the outset of 
this review of an important new study by the Centre for European 
Policy Studies. First, the performance and efficiency of the banking 
sector has a major impact on a country’s overall efficiency and economic 
performance, and second, for several European banks, business models 
changed markedly in the years running up to the banking crisis and are 
currently in a state of flux. Business models will continue to evolve in the 
post-crisis scenario. In this context, CEPS’ report on contrasting business 
models of banks and an assessment of their implications could not be more 
timely. The report offers a unique and comprehensive empirical study of 
different bank business models and their implications for risk 
characteristics, systemic stability, bank performance, efficiency and 
governance issues. 
The report gives the results of the first screening exercise of the 
business models of 26 major European banks before and after the crisis. On 
the basis of state-of-the-art methodology and detailed statistical analysis, 
the authors find that three major alternative business models can be 
identified:  
•  Retail banks: those using customer deposits as the primary source of 
funding and providing predominantly customer loans (this group 
kept fairly close to the traditional banking model); 
•  Investment banks: those with substantial trading and derivatives 
activity; and 
•  Wholesale banks: those institutions that are  active in wholesale and 
interbank markets with a focus on  domestic business.   
The 26 large banks and banking groups in the sample accounted for 
55% of total EU banking assets. The period covered was 2006-09, giving 108 
bank-year observations. A wide range of performance and other indicators 
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was used related to structure, ownership, financial activity, financial 
performance, risk, impact of the crisis and governance issues. 
The study was carried out in four stages.  Firstly, the sample of banks 
was selected, based largely on the availability of data for large banks. The 
second stage involved the creation of a large database in order to construct 
a picture of business models, profitability, asset and liability structure, 
earnings performance, stability and governance aspects for each of the 
banks in the sample. This created over 200 variables for each bank/year 
observation. The third stage involved identifying different business 
models, using cluster analysis methodology. The business models are 
distinguished largely in terms of the banks’ scope of activities and funding 
strategies. In the fourth stage, the three identified business models were 
evaluated and compared for relative performance, riskiness, governance 
and other relevant dimensions. 
On the basis of a new and comprehensive data set, the report 
identifies a credible and extremely useful categorisation of alternative 
business models, based on a sound methodology, namely:  
•  There is a unique and systematic analysis of the implications of 
alternative business models in five main dimensions: risk 
characteristics, systemic stability, bank performance, efficiency and 
corporate governance. The report provides an excellent survey of the 
positive and negative aspects of different business models. 
•  Advances are made in methodology and statistical testing, which add 
to our understanding of bank performance and behaviour. 
•  The analysis in the report highlights some important regulatory 
implications of different bank business models. 
•  The study offers valuable insights into how the crisis differentially 
impacted on banks with different business models, with retail banks 
being affected less than the other two models, especially in 
comparison with the wholesale bank model. The results of the 
analysis provide some rationale for the recent popularisation of the 
retail banking model, and may also suggest some regulatory 
implications for the future. 
Overall, the results show that the performance of retail banks has in 
general been superior to the other two models. They were also less prone to 
the need for state support during the crisis. In terms of one of the two 
perspectives outlined at the beginning of this review, the report finds that BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | iii 
retail banks continued to support the economy by continuing to extend 
loans to customers.   
This pioneering study contains the results of the first screening of 
European banks’ business models over the period 2006-09. In the process, 
the research has developed a powerful methodology for analysing bank 
business models and bank performance and risk on a continuing basis. 
Several advantages would emerge from future research that would be of 
value to banks, regulators and analysts: 
•  The coverage of banks could be usefully extended, and the 
methodology could be further refined. 
•  The analysis in the report also highlights important areas where more 
disclosure is needed, especially with regard to banks’ risk exposures.  
•  The report correctly identifies that the post-crisis scenario will 
witness transformational changes in bank business models and in the 
conduct of regulation and supervision, the implications of which will 
affect not only banks and the banking sector, but also the wider 
economy. 
In a period of profound change, which the post-crisis scenario is 
likely to be, it is important to have a clear, comprehensive and consistent 
methodology for monitoring what banks do and how their business models 
change over time. 
David T. Llewellyn 
Professor of Money and Banking 
Loughborough University 
 | 1 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
ver the next few years, Europe’s financial regulatory framework is 
likely to experience one of the biggest changes it has ever faced, 
which will undoubtedly have a major impact on many aspects of 
banking and banking models in the EU. In the aftermath of the 2007-09 
financial crisis, the coming years promise to be crucial, with the adoption of 
a number of financial sector reforms within the European Union. Among 
the packages currently on the table, a substantial piece of legislation is the 
amended Capital Requirements Directive, or the so-called ‘CRD IV’. The 
revisions will complement the recent changes that aimed to strengthen the 
capital and disclosure requirements for the trading book and re-
securitisation instruments as well as restrictions to ensure that 
remuneration policies do not lead to excessive risk-taking. More 
specifically, the new amendments will translate the Basel III revisions that 
were adopted in September 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) into European law, tightening the existing capital 
requirements; introduce new rules on liquidity, leverage ratios, counter-
cyclical measures and systemically important financial institutions; and 
amend the definition of capital, counterparty credit risk and rules for 
banking book. Most of these changes will be phased-in gradually between 
now and 2019. Banks will have to respond by adapting their business 
models to the new regulatory environment. 
This report provides the results of a first screening exercise of the 
business models, performance, risk and governance of 26 major European 
banks before and after the crisis. One of our main findings is that the banks 
sampled appear to follow one of three distinct business models. The banks 
identified as ‘retail banks’ have remained close to their original traditional 
banking model, using customer deposits as their primary source of funding 
and providing predominantly customer loans, with limited trading 
exposures. Banks in the second distinct category, the so-called ‘investment 
banks’, are more engaged in trading activities, especially in derivatives 
O2 | INTRODUCTION 
transactions. Due to the inherent volatility of these securities, these banks 
are more likely to actively manage their balance sheets to mop up any 
excess capacity, relying on short-term funding sources. The third category 
consists of what can be loosely called ‘wholesale banks’. In comparison 
with their peers, these banks are more active in the interbank markets and 
remain mostly domestic.  
The results show that the performance of retail banks has been in 
general better than all other banks. Despite their relative size, these 
traditional banks exhibit commendable stability and have been less likely to 
receive state support. Moreover, the retail banks in our sample have 
continued to support the economy by extending their customer loans, 
despite the crisis. In turn, the wholesale banks are performing possibly the 
worst, and hence are the most likely to receive state support. Investment 
banks remain in between these two extremes, although their performance is 
likely to be comparable to or possibly better than that of retail banks in the 
pre-crisis years.  
This report does not intend to serve as an exhaustive impact 
assessment, but it nevertheless aims to anticipate and offer insights into the 
likely results of the forthcoming regulatory changes. The material is 
organised into seven chapters and as many annexes. Following this 
introduction, Chapter 2 delves into the reasons why banks’ business 
models evolved as they did in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Chapter 
3 provides a comprehensive review of the literature about business models 
and risk-taking. Chapter 4 outlines the sample of banks studied and the 
methodology employed. Chapters 5 and 6 present the results and 
conclusions and finally a concluding chapter looks at changing business 
models of banks in the post-crisis period and speculates on the potential 
regulatory implications. Most of the appendices provide supporting 
technical information about the banks surveyed and our methodology. 
Appendix III contains a brief profile of each of the 26 banks surveyed, 
containing a description of their activities, a listing of any state aid received 
and the ensuing restructuring/expansion. | 3 
 
 
2.  CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS OF 
EUROPEAN BANKS 
ver the past few decades, prior to the onset of the banking crisis, 
several structural features of the global banking environment 
changed, producing major changes in bank business models across 
Europe and also worldwide. Finance in general, and banking in particular, 
as an industry expanded substantially and unsustainably (‘excessive 
financialisation’). The role of banks in the financial system increased, banks 
and financial markets became more closely linked and integrated and 
business models changed in several important ways. It is likely, however, 
that many of these changes will now be reversed in the post-crisis scenario. 
Traditionally, banks have performed fundamental economic roles, 
mainly as liquidity providers, maturity transformers, risk managers and 
financial innovators. Depending on how properly they perform these roles 
during the macroeconomic cycle, they either become shock absorbers or on 
the contrary shock originators – as was the case during the financial crisis.  
Over the last decades, signs of ‘excessive financialisation’ were 
manifested in numerous dimensions: the increasing role of banks in the 
financial intermediation process, a sharp rise in the assets of the banking 
system relative to GDP, the rapid growth and overall size of the financial 
system in the economy, the burgeoning leverage of banks and the overall 
debt-to-GDP levels in the economy, the degree of intra-sector leverage (the 
extent to which leverage increased within the financial sector as financial 
institutions became increasingly exposed to each other), the frenetic pace of 
financial innovation, the sharp rise in trading volumes of banks, the market 
capitalisation of banks relative to overall market capitalisation of stock 
market companies and the share of total profits in the economy accounted 
for by banks. 
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Several factors lay behind the financialisation process in the years 
leading up to the crisis: 
•  Excess leverage and an under-capitalisation meant that banks could 
expand at a faster rate and to a higher level than would have been 
possible had they maintained a level of capital commensurate with 
their risks. Overall, banks became highly leveraged with a rise in 
assets on the balance sheet relative to total capital (Alessandri & 
Haldane, 2009; Wehinger, 2008).  
•  The systematic under-estimation and under-pricing of risks due to 
the macroeconomic environment and the collective euphoria of the 
pre-crisis years increased both the demand for loans and the 
willingness of banks to meet that demand to maintain an upward 
cycle.  
•  The collective euphoria and the high profitability of banks at the time 
meant that the cost of capital was artificially low because it did not 
reflect the true risks that banks were incurring. This amounted to an 
effective subsidy. A perceived safety-net for banks also had the effect 
of lowering banks’ cost of funding. 
•  For various reasons, including the nature of the competitive 
environment at the time, banks adopted more short-term strategies to 
maximise the rate of return on equity. In truth, profitability was 
enhanced not by superior banking performance, but by banks raising 
their risk threshold and moving up the risk ladder. Internal reward 
and bonus structures created a bias towards short-termism and also 
towards excess risk-taking (Llewellyn, 2010). 
Each of these factors, both individually but especially in combination, 
created sufficient conditions for an over-expansion of banking activity and 
an artificially enhanced role of banks and other non-regulated financial 
institutions in the intermediation process.  
Several structural changes in the global financial system set the 
background to the financial crisis and brought about the emergence of new 
business models in banking.  
A defining feature of financial history since the early 1990s was the 
sharp rise in the pace of financial innovation, and especially in the use of 
credit derivatives designed to shift credit risk away from loan originators. 
A major feature of the pre-crisis period was a massive rise in the volume of 
trading in complex, and sometimes opaque, derivatives contracts. The Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) has estimated that the notional amounts BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 5 
outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC) credit default swap (CDS) contracts 
rose to around $60 trillion by December 2007. One of the factors 
precipitating the crisis was the exposure of banks to large holdings of 
securities that were hard to value given the absence of liquid markets. In 
fact, many credit derivatives were hardly ever traded on any significant 
scale. Banks became exposed to capital markets and securities trading risks 
that they did not themselves manage or sometimes truly understand. In 
addition, over time, banks’ holdings of liquid assets fell and their reliance 
on wholesale markets for liquidity and funding requirements increased.  
Another feature is the more market-centric structure of financial 
systems, which implied a rise in the role of financial markets relative to 
institutions in the financial intermediation process. Furthermore, banks and 
markets became increasingly integrated (Boot & Thakor, 2009). One of the 
many implications of this trend was that losses incurred in markets were at 
times translated into funding problems for banks. Furthermore, financial 
systems became more susceptible to market shocks, particularly in a 
continuous increase in interconnectedness and network externalities.1 
                                                      
1 Haldane (2009) defines the network as being both complex and adaptive: complex 
by virtue of the many interconnections within the network, and adaptive in that 
behaviour is driven by the interactions between optimising agents. He describes 
trends in the network as increased connectivity, there being a small number of 
hubs with multiple spokes, and the average path length within the network 
became shorter over time, leading to a small number of degrees of separation 
between countries and institutions. As a result, comparatively small shocks can 
have large systemic implications. Several factors contributed to the rise in network 
externalities, including the enhanced trading in derivatives (and credit derivatives 
in particular), the growing links between instruments and institutions, the 
increased globalisation of finance, the trend towards de-regulation, banks 
diversifying into a wider range of business lines and into securities trading in 
particular, the growing homogeneity of banks in their business models, and the 
greater use by banks of wholesale market funding. Each of these trends had the 
effect of increasing the degree of connectedness between institutions and, as a 
result, the potential power of network externalities. Increased connectivity also 
complicated the monitoring of indirect counterparty risks. While bank A may be 
able to monitor its individual exposure to bank B, it becomes increasingly complex 
when bank B has a multitude of exposures within the network via derivatives and 
contingent liabilities, as this gives rise to indirect counterparty risks originating 
elsewhere in the network. 6 | CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS OF EUROPEAN BANKS 
Network externalities and the increasing connectedness of financial 
institutions with each other and with markets increased sharply in the 
years prior to the crisis. In the process, banks became exposed to capital 
market risks that they did not themselves manage or, in some cases, even 
understand. This increased connectedness meant that the number of banks 
that became potentially ‘systemically significantly’ increased. The increased 
connectedness arose through many channels, including, inter alia increased 
exposures in the inter-bank market, banks buying credit risk-shifting 
instruments and other derivatives issued by other banks, all banks trading 
in the same instruments and the reduced systemic diversity as banks 
adopted similar business models.  
To complete the picture, largely unregulated ‘shadow banks’, such as 
hedge funds and structured investment vehicles (SIVs) emerged as major 
new players in the financial intermediation process (Tett, 2008) with all the 
risks and new sources of instabilities they bring.  
The nature of bank risks also changed. Securitisation and other credit 
derivatives were designed specifically to shift credit risk and, for some 
years, they did just that. However, they also changed the nature of risk and, 
in particular, transformed credit risk into liquidity risk (buyers of the 
securities issued to purchase securitised assets from banks being unable to 
trade them), then into a funding risk (the securitising banks being unable to 
either sell assets at other than fire-sale prices or roll-over maturing debt), 
and ultimately into a solvency risk. The latter arose because banks were 
unable to sell assets in order to continue funding their securitisation 
programmes.  
A defining structural change was the combination of increased 
diversification and reduced diversity. In many ways, financial firms 
became less differentiated in that they followed a common policy of 
diversification, applied new business models, used similar risk analysis 
models and developed rates of return on equity strategies more forcefully.  
As a consequence, banks developed new business models and moved 
away from their traditional model of ‘originate-to-hold’, whereby banks 
issue loans and hold the risk in their books. The emergence of new business 
models focused largely, though not entirely, on new credit risk-shifting 
instruments. Several trends in bank business models emerged in the years 
leading up to the crisis: 
•  Banks increasingly diversified into more lines of business activity, 
some of which had previously been prohibited by regulation. BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 7 
•  Securitisation of loans became a central business strategy for many 
banks. 
•  Investment and trading activity increased sharply, and the 
proportion of traded assets in the total balance sheet rose 
substantially in many cases. 
•  Banks reduced their holdings of liquid assets as they developed 
greater access to wholesale funding markets. 
•  The extent of maturity transformation also increased sharply as 
greater use was made of short-maturity money market funding 
sources. 
•  An increased dependency developed on wholesale and money 
market funding. 
•  A powerful trend emerged towards using credit derivatives as a 
means of shifting credit risk (a notion was called into question during 
the crisis). 
It is instructive to begin with a stylised review of the traditional 
model of the banking firm (see Llewellyn, 1999, for a fuller discussion). 
Banks traditionally have information, risk analysis and monitoring 
advantages, which enable them to solve asymmetric information problems 
and hence mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard. Banks accept deposits 
and utilise their comparative advantages to transform deposits into loans. 
In this model, the bank accepts the credit (default) risk, holds the asset on 
its own balance sheet, monitors its borrowing customers and holds 
appropriate levels of capital to cover unexpected risk. It also effectively 
‘insures’ its loans internally through the risk premia incorporated into the 
rate of interest on loans. In this process, the bank offers an integrated 
service in that it performs all the core functions in the financial 
intermediation process. 
Furthermore, in this traditional model, the bank is not able to shift 
credit risk to other agents because of its asymmetric information 
advantages: a potential buyer or insurer of a loan from a bank might judge 
that, because of the bank’s information advantage, there is an adverse 
selection and moral hazard problem in that the bank might select low-quality 
loans to pass on and, if it knew that it could pass on risk, it might be less 
careful in assessing the risk of new loans and would conduct less-intensive 
monitoring of borrowers after loans have been made. For the same reason, 
the traditional view of the bank is that it is unable to externally insure its 
credit risks and instead applies a risk (insurance) premium on loans and 8 | CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS OF EUROPEAN BANKS 
holds capital as an internal insurance fund. The reason for this outcome is 
that, given the uncertainties outlined above, an external insurer would 
reflect this uncertainty in the insurance premium charged to the bank. In 
this traditional view of the bank, therefore, credit risk cannot be shifted or 
insured, there is no liquidity in bank loans and banks are locked into their 
loan portfolios. 
However, many aspects of this traditional model came to be 
questioned. In the securitisation model, the process of securitisation 
(including via collateralised debt obligations or CDOs) means that the bank 
is able to sell loans (which the traditional model denies) and hence the bank 
does not hold the loan asset on its own balance sheet and does not absorb 
the credit risk. Hence it does not need to hold capital against the credit risk. 
However, this depends precisely upon how the securitisation is conducted 
and especially whether the SPV (special purpose vehicle) is truly 
bankruptcy-remote from the bank and vice versa. 
The CDS model is similar to the securitisation model except that, 
while the credit risk is passed to the protection seller, the asset remains on 
the balance sheet of the originating bank. In this model there is explicit 
external insurance of bank loans. 
These business alterations to the traditional model of the banking 
firm meant that banks were no longer required to perform all the functions 
in the bank intermediation process. Furthermore, banks were also able to 
outsource some of their other activities such as loan administration, credit 
assessment through credit-scoring models of other banks, etc. This further 
challenged the traditional view of the integrated bank. Banking was no 
longer a totally integrated process whereby a bank conducts all the 
functions in the loan process. Credit risk transfer facilities and instruments 
changed the relationship between borrowers and lenders and created 
different incentive structures than had been present in the traditional 
model of the banking firm. As a result, banks stopped behaving in the 
traditional way as market-makers in credit risk and, in effect, came to act as 
brokers in credit risk between ultimate borrowers and those who either 
purchased asset-backed securities or who offered CDS insurance. 
Therefore, the balance sheets of banks no longer provide the real picture of 
banks’ activities as the off-balance sheet became ever more important.  | 9 
 
 
3.  THE LITERATURE ON BUSINESS 
MODELS OF BANKS 
conomic literature provides several reasons why banks may choose 
to diversify their business models instead of specialising in a narrow 
range of activities. This is seen, for instance, in the bancassurance 
model, which became common in many European countries. First, by 
providing a service, banks gain valuable information on their clients that 
might provide advantages in the provision of other services (Sharpe, 1990; 
Diamond, 1991; Rajan, 1992). Second, by engaging in a wide range of 
activities, banks may also reduce their risks through diversification and 
economies of scope (Diamond, 1984). Lastly, as regulatory reforms 
diminish competitive inequalities, banks with different models compete 
with one another, providing incentives to offer a broader range of products 
to their customers. Many banks have also adjusted their business profiles to 
reflect changes in the demographic structure of their retail client base. 
Although diversification may prove beneficial to the bank, it may also 
endanger social welfare. A typical bank-client relationship can harbour a 
variety of conflicts of interests, providing informational advantages to 
banks vis-à-vis the market. For example, first-hand information on 
borrowers may enable a bank to extract monopolistic rents to ‘lock-in’ the 
customer to its services in the future (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). These 
incumbent advantages may hinder competition in the market by acting as 
barriers to entry (Dell’Ariccia et al., 1999; Marquez, 2002). Alternatively, 
confronted with exclusive information about the financial health of their 
clients, banks may underwrite a troubled firm’s securities despite known 
risks, in an attempt to secure the repayment of earlier loans (Kanatas & Qi, 
1998).  
The potential for conflicts of interests underline the modern versions 
of the arguments raised against the ‘universal banks’ in the aftermath of the 
Great Depression. The US Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 imposed such a 
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separation or a ‘firewall’ between the securities and commercial (retail) 
activities of banks. In the years that followed, some of the European 
countries also imposed similar restrictions to limit the emergence of 
universal banks. The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 and the 
initiatives in the EU in the 1980s and 1990s, most notably the Second 
Banking Directive (1989/646/EEC), have been the main drivers for the re-
diversification of the banking models on both sides of the Atlantic.2 As a 
result of these developments, the banks have turned increasingly to non-
interest income sources and non-traditional activities. 
Whilst diversification of individual banks might seem to reduce their 
overall risk and may be one of the central motives, there is also a systemic 
dimension to consider as this might make the system as a whole less 
diversified. Andy Haldane (2009) of the Bank of England suggests that as 
banks diversified into each others’ traditional areas, and most especially 
into the capital markets business, the system became less diverse and, 
therefore, potentially more vulnerable to common shocks. Furthermore, the 
diversification of banks into derivatives trading also has a systemic 
dimension. Many commentators (and central bankers) argued before the 
crisis that credit-risk-shifting derivatives should make the system less risky 
because risks were spread more optimally. However, this seems not to have 
been the experience during the crisis. Rajan (1992) has suggested that these 
new instruments might have made the system less vulnerable in the face of 
small, uncorrelated shocks, but more vulnerable to large, correlated shocks. 
The recent deregulation drive was supported by arguments to allow 
banks to achieve more favourable economies of scope and better 
diversification of risks (Barth et al., 2000).3 The arguments were largely 
                                                      
2 The diversified banking model reappeared in Europe prior to the Second Banking 
Directive of 1989. The Directive and the accompanying regulations have only 
harmonised the legal and regulatory framework applicable to all types of banks. In 
an attempt to enhance integration within the EU’s internal market, the single 
banking passport was introduced, facilitating cross-border businesses and 
introducing common regulatory and supervisory standards. The regulations have 
nevertheless enhanced the expansion opportunities of EU banks, both 
geographically and in scope.  
3 The discussion on the separation of banks’ activities resurfaced in the midst of the 
financial crisis in the US during the deliberations for the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The original proposal, endorsed by 
President Obama in January 2010, contained the so-called ‘Volcker rule’ which 
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backed by evidence that failed to show substantial differences in the quality 
of securities underwritten by the universal banks and specialised 
investment houses (Kroszner & Rajan, 1994; Puri, 1994).  
How does the universal banking model fare in terms of risk-taking, 
performance and efficiency in the light of recent evidence? A number of 
empirical studies have addressed this question. The common finding is that 
although diversification may expand the range of opportunities, these 
benefits may be more than offset by the costs from increased exposure to 
volatility (DeYoung & Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004 and 2006b; Stiroh & 
Rumble, 2006). Focarelli et al. (2011) show that securities underwritten by 
universal banks are riskier than those underwritten by specialised 
investment houses. The authors, however, argue that the increased risk-
taking is due to an attempt to expand market share, and not conflicts of 
interest. Others have found that although diversification may enhance 
market valuations, expanding banks hold much less capital and engage in 
more risky activities (Demsetz & Strahan, 1997; Baele et al., 2007; 
Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010b).  
An important development in the banking sectors in most developing 
countries since the 1990s is the rapid growth of securitisation and 
structured products.4 In a nutshell, securitisation allows banks to pool their 
risky assets and sell them to outside investors, potentially transferring the 
associated credit risks to the markets.5 Traditionally, the growth in these 
transactions has been justified by the mutual benefits they offer to both 
investors and originators. From the point of view of the investors, buying 
the products has been attractive due to the diversification benefits – as long 
as the products are not correlated with other holdings. From the lender’s 
perspective, the transaction eliminates exposure to risks and, in the case of 
regulated entities, reduces required capital charges. 
                                                                                                                                       
would have prohibited banks from engaging in purely proprietary trading and put 
severe restrictions on owning or investing in hedge funds or private equity funds. 
A much watered-down version of the bill was enacted in June 2010, which allowed 
banks to engage in a broader range of proprietary trading activities. 
4 A s  a r g u e d  i n  D u f f e e  &  Z h o u  ( 2 0 0 1 ) ,  a m ong other structured products, credit 
default swaps can also be used for the purpose of transferring risks to other 
investors.  
5 See Neal (1996) for an early discussion on the use of structured products for 
controlling credit risk. See also Brunnermeier (2009, pp. 78-82) for a concise 
description of securitisation and other structured products. 12 | LITERATURE ON BUSINESS MODELS OF BANKS 
The benign view of securitisation and structured products has been 
challenged during the 2007-09 financial crisis. To summarise, the rising 
popularity of these transactions have led to a “flood of cheap credit” and 
growth of an interconnected institutions that are not regulated, or ‘shadow 
banks’ (Brunnermeier, 2009; Pozsar et al., 2010). A particularly critical 
argument has been the effect of securitisation on credit standards. Since 
most credit risks are borne by outside investors, banks had little incentive 
to properly screen (and monitor) loans.6 There is mounting empirical 
evidence that credit standards were indeed incrementally lowered in the 
US prior to the crisis (Mian & Sufi, 2009; Keys et al., 2010). There are also 
questions concerning the extent to which the originators were able to 
offload their risks. Although the SPVs are, at least in theory, legally 
separate entities, the originating institution nevertheless had substantial 
exposures from the liquidity enhancements and forms of retained interests 
(Gorton et al., 2006). Indeed, originating institutions have taken a 
substantial part of the losses during the crisis, achieving “securitisation 
without risk transfer” (Greenlaw et al., 2008; Shin, 2009; Acharya et al., 
2010b). According to these arguments, structured products are attractive 
because they allowed the originating institutions to expand their balance 
sheets while reducing their capital charges, potentially facilitating 
regulatory arbitrage.7 
A parallel development to the diversification of banking activities has 
been the diversification of funding strategies. Over the past few years, 
many banks have reduced their reliance on traditional retail depositors and 
turned to short-term funding in the interbank and wholesale markets. In 
essence, short-term funds allow banks to manage their balance sheet sizes 
actively in a highly pro-cyclical manner (Adrian & Shin, 2008 and 2010). In 
this manner, the diversification of funding strategies is an offshoot of the 
increasing trading activities. For banks that engage heavily in trading, 
when the value of mark-to-market securities increases, their equity also 
                                                      
6 The concern that securitisation may lower credit standards is not new. Gorton & 
Pennacchi (1995) model a bank’s choice between holding loans and selling them, 
focusing on the potential for moral hazard. They conclude that if the banks hold a 
certain fraction of the securitised loans (or provide limited recourse), then the 
moral hazard problem could be partly mitigated. See also Ayadi & Behr (2009) for 
a similar argument for the credit derivatives markets. 
7 See also Jones (2000) on the potential use of structured products and derivative 
transactions for achieving regulatory arbitrage.  BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 13 
increases. The institutions use this ‘surplus capacity’ to expand their 
balance sheets even further by borrowing and issuing new securities. 
Repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repurchase agreements 
(reverse repos), in which a financial institution sells a security (or buys it, in 
the case a reverse repo) to buy (or sell) it back later, are extremely suitable 
for this purpose. Institutions may also expand their activities and 
borrowing through the use of off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles 
(Acharya et al., 2010b). 
The literature provides divergent views on the impact of the 
increased use of these short-term funding (and lending) alternatives. The 
‘bright-side’ argument suggests that relying more on market funding may 
enhance market discipline. Provided that they are credibly excluded from 
the safety net, holders of subordinated debt may perform monitoring roles 
that cannot be fulfilled by the small and dispersed depositor holders 
(Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; Calomiris, 1999). More pessimistically, however, 
the market’s monitoring incentives could be undermined by the 
expectation of government intervention in the ‘too-big-to fail’ (TBTF) 
banks, i.e. moral hazard. When a bail-out is a credible likelihood, the 
market’s perception of risk may diverge substantially from the stand-alone 
risk represented by the bank’s operations. Apart from weakening the debt-
holders’ incentives to apply monitoring and market discipline, i.e. moral 
hazard, such imperfections may also motivate banks to become large 
enough to be considered too-big-to-fail.8 There is some empirical evidence 
(also supported by this study) suggesting that banks that are judged to be 
TBTF receive a superior rating, other things being equal, which in turn 
lowers the cost of market funding.  
Another argument against the heavy use of short-term funding is the 
potential drying-up of liquidity in the event of a crisis. When banks become 
reliant on short-term financing, such as overnight repos, they need to 
rollover a substantial part of their funding on a daily basis, making them 
severely exposed to a sudden drying up of liquidity. Short-term lending, 
such as reverse-repo transactions, also exposes institutions to liquidity risk, 
seriously undermining the value of any collateral backing the transaction. 
In short, the trend towards the increasing use of these short-term 
instruments was seen to be among the chief explanations for the 
                                                      
8 Banks may also outgrow their optimal size and may overextend their activities if 
doing so allows the management to extract private benefits, such as more power or 
compensation or to build empires (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986).  14 | LITERATURE ON BUSINESS MODELS OF BANKS 
cataclysmic setbacks faced by some banks in the early phases of the 
financial crisis (Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian & Shin, 2010).  
By and large, the literature has confirmed that state support is likely 
to dampen the risks of debt-holders (even if the bank is inherently risky), 
potentially giving rise to increased moral hazard. O’Hara & Shaw (1990) 
find evidence of net positive wealth effects accruing to large US banks 
covered by the partial deposit insurance schemes put in place in the mid-
1980s. Kane (2000) and Benston et al. (1995) show that bank mergers and 
acquisitions in the same period were partly motivated by the aim of 
creating institutions that were large enough to be covered by the US 
deposit insurance system. In addition to the gains for shareholders, Penas 
& Unal (2004) find that bond-holders also stand to benefit from state 
support that is granted to too-big-to-fail institutions. Implicit government 
insurance effectively serves to weaken (if not reverse) the correlation 
between individual bank risk and debenture yields (Flannery & Sorescu, 
1996). Moreover, the sensitivity of the subordinated note spreads to 
measures of stand-alone risk is lower for state-owned banks and during 
periods of fiscal ease, i.e. when government support is more credible 
(Sironi, 2003).9 
The empirical literature has therefore provided ample support to the 
idea that the monitoring roles of debt-holders may be undermined when 
state intervention is judged to be likely. Moreover, owing to their ability to 
pull back from the markets relatively quickly, short-term creditors may also 
have fewer incentives to conduct proper monitoring (Huang & Ratnovski, 
2010). This would offset one of the key arguments for supporting the 
diversification of the funding strategies. As the recent financial crisis amply 
demonstrated, an excessive reliance on market funding may also invite 
other risks, such as a sudden drying-up of liquidity. Even small changes in 
an institution’s underlying value can lead to a ‘catastrophic drop’ in roll-
over debt capacity and de-leveraging, much like the one that was observed 
in the early phases of the crisis (Acharya et al., 2010a; Acharya & 
Viswanathan, 2011). Recent evidence supports these arguments, showing 
that non-deposit wholesale funding increases bank fragility (Demirgüç-
Kunt & Huizinga, 2010b).  
                                                      
9 In a similar vein, Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga (2010a) provide evidence that 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis, large banks saw a deterioration of their market 
valuations and credit default swap spreads in countries with large public deficits.  BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 15 
To sum up, the economics literature has provided a number of 
reasons why banks seek to diversify their activities and funding strategies. 
However, diversification may in some cases undermine social welfare and 
financial stability, especially in the presence of informational rents, conflicts 
of interest and moral hazard risks. In view of the 2007-09 financial crisis, 
the recent literature singles out the excessive reliance on market-based 
funding as a potentially harmful practice. These concerns are particularly 
acute when market participants have little incentive to monitor the banks 
due to the implicit or explicit government guarantees enjoyed by the banks 
and their creditors.  16 | 
 
 
4.  DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Sample selection and data 
The European banking sector incorporates a rich array of banks, with 
different business models and ownership structures. Apart from the larger 
commercial retail and investment (universal) banks, which focus on a 
broad mix of banking activities, a large number of specialised institutions 
with different ownership structures – public banks, cooperatives, and 
savings institutions – co-exist in this highly diversified market. To a large 
extent, the business models can be distinguished by the scope of activities 
and funding strategies they engage in. Most retail-oriented banks, such as 
commercial, savings and cooperative banks, provide traditional banking 
services to the general public.10 Investment-oriented banks focus more on 
trading activities, relying on a variety of funding sources and often 
maintaining a retail network of their own. Other banks provide services to 
their institutional clients, including large and mid-sized corporations, real 
estate developers, international trade finance businesses, network 
institutions and other financial institutions.  
The sample under study comprises 26 large banks and banking 
groups that are headquartered in the EU, accounting for nearly 55% of the 
                                                      
10 Although most savings and cooperative institutions are local – leaving them 
outside the scope of this study – they nevertheless depend on the services of much 
larger central institutions, which typically provide their network institutions with 
liquidity and represent the group on a consolidated basis for supervisory purposes 
(Desrochers & Fischer, 2005). Recent empirical work has shown that the local 
institutions have comparable performance and efficiency characteristics to their 
commercial peers and have largely weathered the financial crisis unscathed. 
However, a number of Spanish savings banks and the German central institutions 
have been hit hard. For more discussion on the European cooperative and savings 
banks, see Ayadi et al. (2009 and 2010). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 17 
EU’s banking assets.11 The sample selection exercise aimed to choose the 
largest banks (as of 2009) in terms of size of banking activity, i.e. the total 
consolidated assets. The sample covers the years 2006 to 2009; data for 2010 
were not available at the time of the collection exercise. This leads to 108 
bank-year observations.  
The list of the sampled banks, their ownership types, total assets and 
growth of assets for recent years are given in Table 4.1. To account for 
mergers that have taken place in recent years, all of the large pre- and post-
merger entities that qualify as the largest banks have been included in the 
database. In particular, the list covers the French Caisse d’Epargne and 
Banque Populaire, which were merged in 2009 to form the BPCE Group, 
and the Italian Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI, which merged in 2007 to 
form the Intesa Sanpaolo.  
Following the determination of the sample, a database of a large 
variety of variables was compiled to get a picture of the business model, 
profitability, asset and liability structure, earnings performance, stability 
and governance aspects for each one of the sampled banks over the time 
period covered. The compilation exercise relied mostly on publicly 
available information obtained from the banks’ annual reports and 
financial statements. Other variables summarising the public interventions 
were also collected, supplemented with information from major 
international journals and public sources, such as the European 
Commission’s state aid approval documents.12 In addition, data from a pre-
existing database on executive compensation in the EU’s largest banks, 
compiled by CEPS, were also used.13 Lastly, the information on share prices 
and CDS spreads was obtained from Yahoo Finance and Fitch Solutions, 
respectively. 
 
                                                      
11 With total assets of €23.3 trillion in 2009, the sample represents nearly 55% of the 
EU total banking assets (€42.1 trillion), using ECB (2010) aggregate figures. 
Country-by-country shares could not be calculated due to the consolidated figures 
used in the study. 
12 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?clear=1& 
policy_area_id=3 for the European Commission’s database on state aid documents.  
13 See Ayadi, Arbak & de Groen (forthcoming) for research on executive 
compensation in EU’s banking sector using a comparable sampling period and 
data.  18 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Table 4.1 List of banks examined in the report 
Rank 
(2009) 
Name  Country  Type of ownership  
(as of year-end 
2009) 
Total assets  
(€ mil., 2009) 
Change in 
assets (%, 
2006-09) 
1 BNP  Paribas  FR  Commercial  bank  2,057,698 42.9% 
2  Royal Bank of Scotland   UK  Nationalised  1,910,242  94.7% 
3  HSBC Holdings plc  UK  Commercial bank  1,641,297  27.1% 
4  Crédit Agricole S.A.  FR  Cooperative bank  1,557,300  23.5% 
5  Barclays PLC  UK  Commercial bank  1,552,673  38.3% 
6  ING Group N.V.  NL  Commercial bank  1,164,000  -5.1% 
7  Deutsche Bank AG  DE  Commercial bank  1,500,664  -5.3% 
8  Lloyds Banking Group  UK  Commercial bank  1,156,688  199.0% 
9  Banco Santander S.A.  ES  Commercial bank  1,110,529  33.2% 
10  BPCE Group*  FR  Savings bank  1,028,800  .. 
11  Société Générale  FR  Commercial bank  1,023,700  7.0% 
12  UniCredit Group  IT  Commercial bank  928,760  12.8% 
13  Commerzbank Group  DE  Commercial bank  844,103  38.8% 
.. Groupe  Caisse 
d’Epargne* 
FR Savings  bank  649,756***  .. 
14  Intesa Sanpaolo Group**  IT  Commercial bank  624,844  .. 
15  Rabobank Group  NL  Cooperative bank  607,698  9.2% 
16  Dexia SA  BE  Commercial bank  577,630  1.9% 
17  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria  
ES Commercial  bank  535,065  29.9% 
18  Nordea Bank AB  SE  Commercial bank  507,544  46.3% 
19  ABN Amro Holding N.V.  NL  Nationalised  469,345  -52.5% 
20  Dankse Bank Group  DK  Commercial bank  416,361  13.1% 
21 Landesbank  Baden-
Württemberg 
DE Savings  bank  411,694 -1.3% 
..  Banque Populaire Group*  FR  Cooperative bank  403,589***  .. 
22  DZ Bank AG  DE  Cooperative bank  388,525  -7.9% 
23  Hypo Real Estate 
Holding AG 
DE Fully  Nationalised  359,676  122.6% 
24 Bayerische  Landesbank  DE  Savings  bank  338,818  -1.6% 
25  KBC Group NV  BE  Commercial bank  324,231  -0.4% 
..  Banca Intesa**  IT  Commercial bank  291,781****  .. 
..  Sanpaolo IMI**  IT  Commercial bank  288,551****  .. 
26 WestLB  AG  DE  Savings  bank  242,311  -15.1% 
* BPCE was created on 31 July 2009 through the merger of Groupe Caisse D’Epargne and Banque 
Populaire Group. 
** Intesa Sanpaolo Group was created on 1 January 2007 by the merger of Banca Intesa and Sanpaolo 
IMI. 
*** Amount at 31 December 2008. 
****Amount at 31 December 2006. BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 19 
The data collection exercise spanned over 200 variables for each 
bank/year observation (see Appendix I for a complete list). Following the 
collection exercise, a subset of the variables was selected based on data 
availability and relevance. Whenever possible, preference was given to 
variables with the highest coverage ratio, or the share of non-missing 
observations. Indicators on the banks’ general structure, financial position, 
riskiness, crisis measures and governance were constructed from this 
subset. The final set of indicators used in identifying and assessing the 
business models is given in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Description of indicators used in the report 
Variable Coverage  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
STRUCTURE         
Number of branches (per bil. € of assets)  92%  4.725  4.569  0.007  18.414 
Number of employees (per bil. €  of assets)  98%  0.100  0.058  0.004  0.232 
OWNERSHIP           
Cooperative bank (dummy var.)  100%  0.139  0.347  0.000  1.000 
Savings bank (dummy var.)  100%  0.148  0.357  0.000  1.000 
State-owned bank (dummy var.) a  100%  0.157  0.366  0.000  1.000 
Private block owners (% owned) b  100%  0.217  0.311  0.000  1.000 
Listed on stock exchange (dummy var.)  100%  0.722  0.450  0.000  1.000 
FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES         
Total assets (% of GDP)  100%  0.785  0.590  0.070  2.347 
Customer loans (% of assets)  96%  0.427  0.160  0.092  0.714 
Customer deposits (% of assets)  96%  0.314  0.119  0.037  0.597 
Loans to banks (% of assets)  100%  0.115  0.087  0.006  0.406 
Loans to public authorities (% of assets)  28%  0.220  0.222  0.014  0.678 
Domestic assets (% of assets) c  100%  0.658  0.258  0.041  1.000 
Reverse repurchase agreements (% of assets)  89%  0.070  0.048  0.009  0.233 
Repurchase agreements (repos) (% of assets)  92%  0.076  0.051  0.000  0.228 
Liquid assets (% of deposits) d  100%  0.014  0.012  0.001  0.063 
Trading assets (% of assets) e  96%  0.440  0.169  0.194  0.893 
Total derivative exposure (% of assets) f  95%  0.250  0.200  0.034  1.107 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE         
Net interest income (% of total income)  100%  0.753  1.837  -3.240  18.803 
Commission & fee income (% of total income)  100%  0.290  0.457  -1.332  4.500 
Trading income (% of total income)  98%  -0.113  2.354  -23.213  5.106 
Return on assets (RoA) g  100%  0.004  0.006  -0.015  0.017 
Return on equity (RoE) g  100%  0.081  0.252  -1.166  1.473 
Cost-to-income ratio (CIR) h  100%  0.762  1.432  -3.180  14.664 
RISK         
Z-score (no. of std. devs. from default) i  89%  17.395  28.695  -0.889  152.862 
Risk-weighted assets (RWA) (% of assets)  87%  0.373  0.125  0.140  0.693 
CDS spread (annual avg., basis points)  69%  61.239  49.249  4.442  223.715 
Stock return volatility (std. dev. of daily returns)  67%  0.030  0.019  0.009  0.082 
Tier 1 capital ratio (% of risk-weighted assets)  87%  0.085  0.024  0.034  0.199 
Tangible common equity (% of assets) j  100%  0.025  0.010  0.002  0.055 
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CRISIS 
Government guarantees (dummy var.)  100%  0.259  0.440  0.000  1.000 
Government recapitalisation (dummy var.)  100%  0.546  0.500  0.000  1.000 
GOVERNANCE         
Total audit fees (per 000’s of € of assets)  90%  0.032  0.013  0.006  0.063 
Statutory audit fees (per 000’s of € of assets)  87%  0.023  0.011  0.004  0.051 
Long-term bonus plan (dummy var.)  89%  0.740  0.441  0.000  1.000 
Formal option plan (dummy var.)  89%  0.646  0.481  0.000  1.000 
Annual bonuses (% of total annual pay)  67%  0.347  0.304  0.000  0.876 
Compensation committee (dummy var.)  89%  0.729  0.447  0.000  1.000 
Notes: 
a At least 50% owned by public authorities. 
b Private block owners are those that own more than a 5% stake, excluding the stakes of domestic public 
authorities. 
c Whenever data on domestic assets were unavailable in annual reports, aggregate data on assets of 
foreign affiliates were used. 
d Liquid assets are cash and balances at the central bank divided by total deposits. 
e Trading assets are total assets minus liquid assets (cash and deposits at central bank) minus total loans 
minus intangible assets. 
f  Total derivative exposures are the sum of positive and negative fair values of all derivative 
transactions. 
g Before-tax profits are used to calculate both RoA and RoE figures. 
h CIR is defined as the ratio of total operating expenses divided by total income. 
i See Appendix II for details on the calculation of z-score. 
j Tangible common equity is common equity minus intangible assets (goodwill and other) minus 
treasury shares; common equity is defined as common stock plus additional paid-in capital plus 
retained earnings. 
k Long-term bonus plans are those that reward the CEOs with cash or shares, conditional on multiple-
year performance criteria. 
l Share of annual bonus (excluding long-term bonuses) in total annual pay. 
 
4.2  Methodology 
In line with the study’s aim of identifying different business models and 
screening for major weaknesses, the analysis is conducted in two phases. In 
the first phase, several instruments from Table 4.2 were used as a basis for 
the creation of distinct business models with the use of cluster analysis 
tools. In the second phase, the business models were evaluated and 
compared based on their relative performance, riskiness, governance and 
other relevant factors.  
Loosely defined, cluster analysis is a statistical technique for 
assigning a set of observations (i.e. a particular bank in a particular year) 
into distinct clusters (i.e. business models). By definition, observations that 
are assigned to the same cluster share a certain degree of similarity, 
measured by a set of instruments. The formation of clusters ensures that 
they are sufficiently dissimilar between themselves, identifying different 
distinguishing characteristics of the observations they represent. To create BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 21 
the clusters, the initial step, is to determine a set of instruments for 
identifying any similarities or distinctions. The second step – more 
technical in nature – is to determine the methods for measuring similarities, 
for partitioning the clusters, and for determining the appropriate number 
of clusters (i.e. the ‘stopping rule’). 
One of the key problems often encountered in clustering is the 
presence of missing values. When a particular observation has one or more 
missing instrument values, it has to be dropped from the cluster analysis 
since the similarity measures cannot be computed. The sample used in the 
study contains many such cases, despite efforts to choose indicators with 
high coverage ratios. In order to accommodate the entire sample of 
observations in the cluster analysis, multiple imputation techniques were 
used to fill in missing values with OLS regression estimates using the 
existing set of indicators as predictors. Potential errors were accounted for 
by producing a total of 10 random estimates, drawn randomly from the 
predicted distributions.14 This procedure multiplied the sample size by a 
factor of 10, comprising 10 datasets that are exact copies of one another 
except for the randomly drawn or filled-in estimates. The cluster analysis 
was applied to the pooled dataset, providing a confidence level for 
observations involving missing values. 
Assuming that banks consciously choose their business models, any 
cluster analysis should be based on instruments over which the banks can 
have a direct influence. For example, a bank is likely to have a great degree 
of choice over its general structure, financial position and some of the risk 
indicators.15 In turn, most of the performance indicators are related to 
instruments that are beyond the bank’s control, such as market conditions, 
systemic risks, consumer demand, etc. This was indeed one of the principal 
reasons why details on income sources (i.e. interest vs. non-interest income) 
were not used as instruments in the creation of the clusters. 
The business models used in the study distinguish between the key 
banking activities, funding strategies, financial exposures, risks and 
                                                      
14 The use of a greater number of imputations (i.e. 20 or 30) did not change the 
results.  
15 All of the instruments used for clustering were standardised so that each 
indicator had a mean zero and a standard deviation of one. This was done to 
prevent any potential biases arising from the choice of units, i.e. use of percentages 
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geographic orientation. To account for these factors collectively, without 
over-representing any particular factor, six instruments were used to form 
the clusters.16 These were: 
1.  Customer deposits (as % of assets). The indicator identifies the share of 
deposits from non-bank and private customers, e.g. households or 
enterprises, in the total balance sheet, indicating reliance on more 
traditional funding sources. 
2.  Trading assets (as % of assets).17 Defined as non-cash assets other than 
loans, a greater value would indicate the prevalence of investment 
activities that are prone to market and liquidity risks. 
3.  Loans to banks (as % of assets). The indicator measures the scale of 
wholesale and interbank activities, which proxy for exposures to risks 
arising from interconnectedness in the banking sector. 
4.  Total derivative exposures (as % of assets).18 This measure aggregates all 
the positive and negative derivative exposures of a bank, which are 
often identified as one of the key (and most risky) financial exposures 
of banks with heavy investment and trading activities. 
5.  Tangible common equity (as % of assets).19 The indicator focuses on the 
most loss-absorbing parts of a bank’s capital structure, providing an 
insight into the bank’s risk attitudes and its leverage. 
6.  Domestic activity (as % of assets).20 While banks that are more 
domestically-oriented are likely to face less cross-border risks, they 
may also face more concentration risks.  
                                                      
16 Alternative instrument combinations were also considered. In many cases, using 
a different set of instruments led to an unrealistically large number of clusters, 
with many comprising a single bank/year. Removing any one of the six indicators 
from the clustering exercise also led to an indistinct clustering. In turn, using a 
larger set did not change the results substantially, as long as the named indicators 
were included.  
17 Trading assets are defined as total assets minus liquid assets (cash and deposits 
at central bank) minus total loans minus intangible assets.  
18 Total derivative exposures are defined as the summation of positive and 
negative fair value of all derivative transactions, including interest, currency, 
equity, OTC, hedge and trading derivatives.  
19 Tangible common equity is defined as common equity minus intangible assets 
(goodwill and other) minus treasury shares; common equity is defined as the sum 
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Turning to the technical aspects, Ward’s (1963) procedures were used 
to form the clusters. The procedures form partitions in a hierarchical 
manner, starting from the largest number of clusters possible (i.e. all 
bank/years in a separate cluster) and merging clusters by minimising the 
within-cluster sum-of-squared-errors for any given number of clusters. 
Several studies found that the Ward clustering methods perform better 
than other clustering procedures for instruments that involve few outliers 
and in the presence of overlaps.21 Moreover, to diagnose the appropriate 
number of clusters, the Calinski & Harabasz’s (1974) pseudo-F index, i.e. 
the ‘stopping rule’, was used. The index is a sample estimate of the ratio of 
between-cluster variance to within-cluster variance.22 The configuration 
with the greatest pseudo-F value was chosen as the most distinct clustering.  
All of the multiple imputation and clustering procedures were 
conducted using Stata’s built-in and user-contributed functions.23 
It is important to highlight once again that cluster analysis is an 
inexact science. The assignment of individual banks to a specific cluster, or 
model, depends crucially on the choice of instruments and procedures, 
such as the proximity metric, procedures for forming clusters and the 
stopping rules used. Although the literature on the technical aspects of 
cluster analysis is relatively well-developed, there is little theory on why 
certain procedures perform better than others.24 In choosing instruments, 
attention was given to testing a variety of alternative configurations. The 
six indicators mentioned above led to the most consistent and distinct 
clustering. Dropping or adding variables resulted in a substantial 
                                                                                                                                       
20 Data on domestic assets were obtained primarily from annual reports; whenever 
the data were unavailable, it was set to equal the total assets of the bank’s foreign 
affiliates divided by its total (consolidated) assets. 
21 See Milligan (1981) and references therein for an assessment of different 
clustering methods.  
22 Evaluating a variety of cluster stopping rules, Milligan & Cooper (1985) single 
out the Calinski and Harabasz index as the best and most consistent rule, 
identifying the sought configurations correctly in over 90% of all cases in 
simulations.  
23 The user-contributed ‘ice.ado’ procedure was used to conduct the multiple 
imputations for missing values. For the clustering exercise, the built-in procedures 
under the cluster function were used.  
24 See Everitt et al. (2001) for a highly readable introduction to cluster analysis and 
some of the practical issues in the choice of technical procedures.  24 | DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
worsening of the statistical measures of distinct clustering, which suggests 
that the chosen set adequately identifies the main distinguishing 
characteristics of the sampled banks. As the discussion below makes clear, 
the characteristics of the business models that are identified by the cluster 
analysis are by and large in line with expectations. Despite these efforts, it 
is certainly true that the outcomes may change with other configurations. 
For these reasons, the results of the present analysis should be interpreted 
with care.  25 | 
 
 
5.  RESULTS 
he following discussion gives the details of the outcomes of the two 
phases of analysis. The first subsection provides the results of the 
cluster formation. The second subsection assesses the identified 
business models, based on a number of indicators of the banks’ general 
structure, performance, riskiness, governance and other relevant factors.  
5.1  Identification of business models 
The clustering procedures summarised in the previous chapter lead to 
highly consistent results. In particular, the results show that the pseudo-F 
indices attain a single maximum, pointing to the three-cluster configuration 
as the most distinct one (see Table 5.1).  
Table 5.1 Pseudo-F indices for clustering configurations 
Number of 
clusters 
Pseudo-F index 
(Calinski & Harabasz) 
Number of 
clusters 
Pseudo-F index 
(Calinski & Harabasz) 
2  401.9 9  363.8 
3  473.0  10  372.4 
4  398.2 11  362.6 
5  376.9 12  356.8 
6  364.7 13  354.7 
7  356.7 14  353.4 
8  361.3 15  352.2 
Note: The Calinski & Harabasz’s (1974) pseudo-F index is an estimate of the between-cluster 
variance divided by within-cluster variance.  
The descriptive details for the three clusters are given below in Table 
5.2 and Figure 5.1. Keeping in mind the word of caution noted at the end of 
the previous chapter, the three business models can be characterised as 
follows.  
T26 | RESULTS 
Model 1, or the so-called ‘retail’ banks  model, comprises 40 
bank/year observations. In essence, these banks use customer deposits as 
the primary means for funding and maintain a relatively high level of loss-
absorbing capital. The cluster mean for the share of customer deposits in 
the balance sheet total is nearly 42%, which is almost one standard 
deviation greater than the sample average and the sub-sample averages 
(and the maxima) for the two other models. In turn, the cluster average for 
the tangible common equity to total assets ratio is 3.1%, which is greater 
than the averages of the other models. In line with their identification as 
retail banks, these banks are less likely to engage in trading activities, with 
non-cash and non-loan assets accounting for one-third of the total assets on 
average, which is lower than the sample mean and the averages for other 
clusters. 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for three clusters 
   Customer 
deposits  
(% of 
assets) 
Trading 
assets  
(% of 
assets) 
Loans to banks 
(% of assets) 
Derivative 
exposures 
 (% of 
assets) 
Tangible 
common 
equity (% 
of assets)  
Domestic 
assets  
(% of assets) 
Model 1 - 
Retail 
 banks 
(40 obs.) 
Mean 42.2% ** 32.9% ** 8.0% ** 15.6% ** 3.1% ** 53.4% ** 
Std. dev.  0.066  0.091  0.032  0.086  0.007  0.271  
Min. 0.303  0.194  0.033  0.034  0.014  0.041  
Max. 0.597  0.554  0.171  0.398  0.052  0.998  
Model 2 - 
Investment 
banks 
(24 obs.) 
Mean 23.0% * 64.7% ** 4.6% ** 51.1% ** 1.9% ** 58.2% ** 
Std. dev.  0.073  0.125  0.029  0.236  0.007  0.176  
Min. 0.087  0.419  0.006  0.245  0.010  0.350  
Max. 0.362  0.893  0.127  1.107  0.035  0.918  
Model 3 - 
Wholesale 
banks 
(44 obs.) 
Mean 23.8% * 43.8% ** 19.4% ** 18.5% ** 2.3% ** 83.8% ** 
Std. dev.  0.083  0.133  0.089  0.095  0.010  0.160  
Min. 0.037  0.278  0.082  0.074  0.002  0.404  
Max. 0.382  0.713  0.406  0.494  0.055  1.000  
All banks 
(108 obs.) 
Mean  31.4%    44.0%    11.5%    25.0%    2.5%    65.8%   
Std. dev.  0.119    0.168    0.087    0.200    0.010    0.256   
Min.  0.037    0.194    0.006    0.034    0.002    0.041   
Max.  0.597    0.893    0.406    1.107    0.055    1.000   
Note: The independence of cluster sub-samples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. According to these tests, a single asterisk (*) 
signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, i.e. the furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) 
signify statistical difference from both clusters.  
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Figure 5.1 Comparison of cluster means, standardised* scores 
 
* The figures represent the number of standard deviations from the sample mean, implying 
that any observation above (below) the zero-axis is above (below) the sample mean.  
Model 2, or the ‘investment’ banks model, comprises 24 bank/year 
observations. As its name clearly implies, the cluster groups together banks 
that have a tendency to engage predominantly in investment activities. In 
particular, the cluster average for trading assets and derivative exposures 
are more than one standard deviation above the sample mean and the 
minima for these two instruments are above the averages of other clusters. 
In turn, these banks are much less likely to engage in interbank lending and 
are substantially more leveraged, with an average tangible common equity-
to-total-assets ratio of barely 1%. Moreover, funding is obtained from more 
non-traditional sources with customer deposits representing less than one-
quarter of the balance-sheet total. 
Model 3, or the ‘wholesale’ banks model, is the largest group, 
comprising 44 observations. The banks in this group tend to be more 
domestically-oriented than the banks in other clusters. The cluster groups 
together banks that are heavily wholesale-oriented and active in the 
interbank markets. Indeed, interbank loans represent nearly one-fifth of the 
balance sheet totals of these banks, exceeding even the maxima for the 
other two clusters, i.e. 17.1% and 12.7% for retail and investment bank 
clusters, respectively. Moreover, much like investment banks, the share of 
customer deposits in total liabilities is lower than average, hinting at an 
extensive reliance on wholesale markets for funding sources.  
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Table 5.3 Assignment of banks to business models 
Model 1  
Retail Banks 
Model 2 
Investment Banks 
Model 3  
Wholesale Banks 
ABN Amro (2006-07)   ABN Amro (2008)  ABN Amro (2009) 
Banca Intesa (2006)   Barclays  Banque Populaire (2006-08)  
Banco Bilbao  BNP Paribas  Bayerische Landesbank  
Banco Santander  Commerzbank (2009)  BPCE Group (2009)  
HSBC  Deutsche Bank  Commerzbank (2006-08)  
ING   RBS (2008-09)  Crédit Agricole  
Intesa Sanpaolo (2007-09)   Société Générale   Danske Bank Group 
KBC  WestLB   Dexia  
Lloyds     DZ Bank  
Nordea     Groupe Caisse d'Epargne (2006-08) 
Rabobank     Hypo Real Estate  
RBS (2006)    Landesbank Baden-Württemberg 
Sanpaolo IMI (2006)    RBS (2007)  
UniCredit      
Notes: Due to the presence of missing data, there is a potential for mistaken assignments. To 
control for these errors, 10 values were drawn from predicted distributions generated 
for each missing value using multiple imputation techniques, leading to 10 data 
points for each bank/year observation (see previous chapter for details). According to 
the results of the cluster analysis, all of the data points for a given observation were 
assigned to the same model, implying a 95% confidence level.  
Having characterised the three business models with which to study 
the 26 banks in the sample, Table 5.3 lists the banks according to the 
cluster(s) into which they fall. As the table clearly shows, although many 
banks have been assigned to a single cluster for the entire sample period, 
some banks have changed their models through the sampled period of 
2006-09. For example, according to the cluster assignments, ABN-Amro has 
switched its business model twice in recent years. First, it switched from a 
retail bank model to an investment bank model in 2008, immediately after 
its takeover by the (former) Fortis, RBS and Banco Santander. And in 2009, 
the bank switched to the wholesale model, following its nationalisation by 
the Dutch government. RBS also started off as a retail bank in 2006, but 
appears to have switched to the investment banking model in 2008. 
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Figure 5.2 Transitions from one model to another 
 
Note: The figures give the share of banks that belong to a specific model in one period 
switching to another model (or remaining assigned to the same model) in the next 
period.  
Despite the occurrences of model switching, most banks are assigned 
to the same business model in the sampling period. Indeed, the transition 
probabilities depicted in Figure 5.2 show that the likelihood of being 
assigned to the same business model is greater than 90% in all three 
groups. Another result that emerges from the transition probabilities is that 
no bank has changed its orientation to become a retail bank. This stands in 
stark contrast with the ambitions stated by the management of some of the 
EU’s top banks. In the years 2008-10, several banks that received state 
support have negotiated restructuring plans with the European 
Commission to concentrate on providing banking services to retail 
customers and small- and medium-sized firms and withdrawing from 
other ‘non-core’ activities.25 Although our sample does not cover more 
                                                      
25 The sampled banks that have negotiated a restructuring plan with the European 
Commission to concentrate more on retail activities include – with the 
Commission’s approval dates cited in parentheses – Dexia (February 2010), KBC 
Group (November 2009), Commerzbank (May 2009), Landesbank Baden-
Württemberg (December 2009), ING Group (November 2009), Lloyds (November 
2009) and RBS (December 2009). Among these banks, the cluster analysis has 
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recent years, it does not show that such a transition occurred for any of the 
surveyed banks in 2008-09. 
It is important to highlight once again that although the methods 
utilised in the study are chosen to limit the subjectivity in the procedures, 
the choice of instruments and procedures nevertheless play an important 
role in the identification of clusters and assignments of banks to a cluster. 
Certain banks may be more appropriately placed in distinctly different 
business models, engaging in a wider array of activities, which may extend 
well beyond the six instruments used here. It may also be more appropriate 
to focus more on certain activities than others in associating banks with a 
specific business model. The identification and assignment procedures take 
account of the average characteristics of each cluster, treating all the six 
covered instruments equally and disregarding others. For these reasons, 
the cluster names and the assignment of banks to individual clusters as 
depicted above should be interpreted with caution. 
5.2  Assessment of models 
To provide an overview of the evaluation of the different banking models 
in the discussion that follows, several key points can be highlighted. First, 
the results show that the performance and risk attributes vary considerably 
both over time and across different models. The retail banks, mostly 
comprising commercial banks relying on interest income, have continued 
to support the economy despite the crisis, thanks to their consistent 
performance. These banks appear to have taken fewer risks, performed 
comparably or even better than their peers, with slightly better governance 
practices than their peers. Wholesale banks tend to be more domestically-
oriented and have an ownership structure that reflects stakeholder values 
(i.e. cooperative or savings banks). These banks perform worse than their 
peers and appear to be more risky, at least within the sampled period. 
Indeed, more than three-quarters of the wholesale banks received some 
form of state support in 2008-09, which is more than in any other group. 
Investment banks, which are also commercially-oriented, are somewhere in 
between, with significantly worsening performances during the crisis and a 
quick rebound in 2009.  
                                                                                                                                       
placed Dexia, Commerzbank, Landesbank Baden-Württemberg and RBS outside 
the retail banking model. For more information and a bank-by-bank analysis of the 
state aid cases, see Appendix III.  BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 31 
Our results also show that despite these marked differences, market-
based indicators of risk, such as CDS spreads, do not seem to reveal any 
disparities in riskiness of different banking models. Moreover, there does 
not appear to be a coherent link between risk measures derived from 
banks’ financial statements and the risk-weights they apply to their 
activities, calling into question the effectiveness of risk-adjusted capital 
requirements. A deeper analysis of risk-taking in individual banks is made 
difficult by a number of factors, including most notably a general lack of 
data and opaqueness on banks’ key risk exposures.  
5.2.1  General structure and activities 
The general structural attributes of the three business models are 
summarised in Table 5.4. The figures show that retail banks are clearly 
more customer-oriented, maintaining a more extensive network of 
branches and with more employees. In turn, investment banks and 
wholesale banks are smaller in size and are more capital-intensive. These 
observations are most likely the direct consequence of the relative size of 
the retail and non-retail activities of the banks. Banks with more retail 
activity need to be present in a broader geographical area, requiring a 
greater number of branches and a larger staff to engage directly with their 
retail customers. In turn, non-core trading and wholesale activities require 
less presence and a greater focus on trading systems and platforms. 
Table 5.4 Structural attributes of business models 
Attribute  Retail Investment  Wholesale  All 
Size (% of GDP)  95.2%  ** 72.6%  ** 63.6%  **  78.5% 
Branches (per bil. € of assets)  8.5  ** 2.5  ** 2.8  **  4.7 
Employees (per bil. € of 
assets) 
144.3  ** 81.1  ** 60.4  **  99.8 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
The independence of cluster sub-samples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. According to these tests, 
a single asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, i.e. the 
furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) signify statistical difference from both clusters.  
The financial activities of the banks are also in line with their business 
models. Indeed, Table 5.5 shows that retail banks are more likely to provide 
customer loans, which represent more than half of their balance sheets. 
These banks have also maintained a high ratio of liquid assets, comprising 
cash and balances at the central bank. Although data availability is an 32 | RESULTS 
issue, wholesale banks appear to devote approximately one-third of their 
balance sheets to lending to public authorities.26 Their liquidity ratios are 
the lowest among the three models, implying potential risks. Investment 
banks, on the other hand, are less likely to provide loans, which is an 
extension of their strategy to engage in trading activities.  
Table 5.5 Financial activities in business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All  
Customer loans (% of assets)  55.4%  **  28.6%  ** 36.5%  **  42.7% 
Loans to public authorities 
(% of assets) 
1.7%  **  5.0%  ** 34.0%  **  22.0% 
Reverse repurchase agreements 
(% of assets) 
5.4%  **  10.3%  ** 6.5%  **  7.0% 
Repurchase agreements (repos) 
(% of assets) 
5.9%  **  10.7%  ** 7.4%  **  7.6% 
Liquid assets (% of deposits)a  1.7%  **  1.3%  ** 1.1%  **  1.4% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
The independence of cluster subsamples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at the 5% level of significance. According 
to these tests, a single asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, 
i.e. the furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) signify statistical difference from both 
clusters.  
a Liquid assets are cash and balances at the central bank divided by total deposits. 
Another interesting characteristic distinguishing the three business 
models is the differing use of short-term market transactions through the 
use of reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos) and repurchase 
agreements (repos). Recent empirical work reveals that institutions with 
large trading portfolios often use these tools to adjust their fluctuating 
leverage levels by heavily engaging in these transactions, (Adrian & Shin, 
2008 and 2010).27 Indeed, reverse repo and repos accounted for nearly 10% 
                                                      
26 Data on loans to public authorities were available for only 45% of the wholesale 
banks. Despite these shortcomings, there is reason to believe that these banks are 
substantially more likely to engage in these activities. In particular, the sample 
minimum for public loans was 14% for wholesale banks, which by and large 
exceeds the sample maxima for the retail and investment banks.  
27 The transactions are popular because they are collateralised, often by securitised 
bonds. In a typical repurchase agreement, the borrower sells some securities – 
often below the market price – only to buy them back at a later date and at a pre-
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of the balance sheets of the investment banks in the sample period, which 
tend to have substantial trading activities. More generally, Figure 5.3 
confirms the presence of a positive relationship between the size of trading 
book and its use of repo funding in our sample. To a large extent, 
investment banks, which tend to have very large trading assets, are more 
likely to use these transactions than others. Retail banks, on the other hand, 
are less active in the short-term funding markets, and evidently more 
reliant on deposits.  
Figure 5.3 Relationship between trading activities and repo funding 
 
Note: The letters R, I and W stand for the retail, investment and wholesale banking models.  
The evolution of repo funding throughout the crisis is of particular 
interest due to the worsening funding conditions. Starting from the early 
phases of the crisis, the repo market came under enormous pressure due to 
fears of counterparty default and declining security prices, especially for 
                                                                                                                                       
set price. In turn, in a reverse repurchase agreement, the roles are reversed: the 
lender buys securities to sell them back at a pre-determined price at a later date. In 
either case, the security serves as collateral if the exchange does not take place 
under the agreed conditions. As noted in the literature review section, these 
transactions may expose the institutions to severe risks from a sudden drying up of 
liquidity in the markets, as was clearly shown in the early phases of the crisis. 
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structured products. Indeed, empirical research suggests that these 
conditions have led to a ‘run on repos’ in the US and Europe, first in 
August 2007 and later on in September 2008, in the aftermath of the failure 
of Lehman Brothers (Gorton & Metrick, forthcoming). Confirming these 
findings, Figure 5.4 shows that all business models reduced their use of 
repos substantially between 2006 and 2009. The greatest one-time drop, 
however, was for investment banks, whose use of repos dropped by more 
than one-third in the early phases of the crisis between 2007 and 2008.  
Figure 5.4 Evolution of repo funding during crisis 
 
Note: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
An important question to ask at this moment is whether the sampled 
banks within each business model have continued to support the economy 
by providing loans. There are many reasons to expect banks to change their 
lending strategies during a crisis. First, faced with losses and severe drops 
in asset prices, a troubled bank has two options to meet its regulatory 
requirements: it can either raise more capital – a costly option in bad times 
– or, more likely, shrink its assets.28 Second, uncertainties about borrowers, 
                                                      
28 When a bank chooses to issue capital, this may signal that the stock may be 
overvalued, which leads to a negative stock response and higher capital costs, 
(Myers & Majluf, 1984). Moreover, once a bank is in trouble and its debt is 
impaired in value, it may be reluctant to raise new equity, even for projects that are 
highly profitable, since part of the value created by the investment will be claimed 
by the creditors and not the shareholders (Myers, 1977). Given this so-called ‘debt-
overhang’ problem, managers acting in line with the interests of the shareholders 
will tend to shrink assets rather than raise new equity.  
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especially in the interbank market when systemic risks exist, may lead to a 
reduction of lending, i.e. ‘flight to quality’ (Lang & Nakamura, 1995; 
Bernanke et al., 1996). A third reason to suspect changing credit issuance is 
the increasing risks associated with trading activities. The potential for 
downward swings may lead some institutions, mainly investment banks, to 
change their business strategies, reduce trading and issue loans to a safer 
class of customers. Finally, ultimately, whether one or more of these effects 
dominate depends largely on the underlying risks for the banks in 
question, the depth of the crisis, systemic risks and, more generally, market 
conditions. 
Figure 5.5 shows that the growth in customer loans has declined 
substantially for investment and wholesale banks. The fact that the growth 
in customer loan portfolios of investment banks has slowed down hints at 
the possibility that some of these banks may be re-orienting their business 
towards retail lending. For wholesale banks, on the other hand, 
outstanding loans have dropped in 2009. Lastly, retail banks have 
continued to expand their lending despite the crisis, even at a faster pace in 
2009 than in prior years. As will be explored in detail below, one possibility 
is that these banks have not been subject to the extent of losses faced by 
other categories and, thus, did not have to adjust balance sheets.  
Figure 5.5 Change in outstanding customer loans from previous year 
 
Note: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
The results confirm the expected characteristics of each business 
model. Retail banks engage more in customer loans, possibly aided by their 
extensive network of branches to undertake relationship banking. 
Investment banks, which by definition focus on trading activities, use 
short-term collateralised borrowing and lending transactions such as repos 
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and reverse repos to actively manage their balance sheets. The findings also 
show that the use of these transactions have declined during the crisis, 
implying underlying difficulties. Despite these issues, both retail banks and 
investment banks have continued to increase their lending activities during 
the crisis. The same is not true for wholesale banks, which substantially 
shrank their lending.  
5.2.2  Performance 
Arguably one of the simplest means to distinguish banks’ business models 
is to analyse their income characteristics, discriminating between interest 
income and other sources, such as commission income, fees and earnings 
from trading activities. Indeed, much of the literature depended on banks’ 
income characteristics to distinguish them from one another.29 Despite the 
ease with which such an analysis can be conducted in good times (i.e. 
income-related indicators are widely available), earnings fluctuate 
substantially during crises, leading to potentially erroneous assignments of 
banks to groups. 
Figure 5.6 summarises the evolution of the income sources over the 
sampled period. The pre-crisis figures for 2006 show that the business 
models can clearly be distinguished with the use of these indicators. Retail 
banks and wholesale banks earn nearly half of their net income through 
interest-related products. For investment banks, however, trading income 
is the main driver, also representing half of net incomes on average. 
Commission and fee income is a secondary earnings source for all banks, 
corresponding to one-quarter of the total.  
Although an earlier phase of the crisis, the 2007 figures show a 
substantial change in the earnings profiles for the investment and 
wholesale banks. Both have experienced a substantial drop in returns from 
trading activities. In particular, investment banks have ended the year with 
losses on their trading activities while wholesale banks have made 
essentially zero returns. In line with these developments, the share of other 
non-trading income streams has increased. Most notably, the share of 
interest income, assumed to be a relatively stable source of income, has 
increased for investment and wholesale banks, even surpassing that for 
retail banks. 
                                                      
29 For the use of income characteristics to identify banks’ underlying business 
models, see Stiroh (2004 and 2006a) and the references therein. BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 37 
Figure 5.6 Evolution of main income sources during crisis 
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Note: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
In 2008, all three categories finished the year with trading losses. This 
is perhaps most evident for wholesale banks, which made substantial 
losses. Retail banks continue to depend mostly on their income earnings 
while a non-trivial proportion of the net income of investment banks is 
from non-traditional sources, including most notably insurance premium 
income. The year 2009 closes off with improving results for retail and 
investment banks, although interest sources have become the key income 
source for all banks. In particular, trading gains appear on the income 
statements of both retail and investment banks. Wholesale banks, however, 
make almost no non-interest income, which highlights a severe problem 
underlying their conditions. 
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Table 5.6 Performance of business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All  
Return on assets (RoA)  0.73%  **  0.18%  ** 0.08%  **  0.37% 
Return on equity (RoE)  14.56%  **  5.45%  ** -1.09%  **  8.11% 
Cost-to-income ratio (CIR)  59.19%  **  76.16%  * 94.92%  *  76.19% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
For the calculation of return on equity (RoE), observations with negative equity 
values were eliminated. The independence of cluster sub-samples was tested using 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at the 5% level of 
significance. According to these tests, a single asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference 
from a single cluster, i.e. the furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) signify statistical 
difference from both clusters. 
Figure 5.7 Evolution of earnings performance during the crisis 
a) Return on assets (RoA) 
 
b) Return on equity (RoE) 
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Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
For the calculation of return on equity (RoE), observations with negative equity 
values were eliminated. Both figures consider pre-tax profits, dividing them by assets 
(RoA) or equity (RoE).  
The comparative performances of the three business models, 
summarised in Table 5.6 and Figure 5.7, confirm the strengths and 
weaknesses identified above. It is easy to see that the crisis has impacted 
the earnings of all banks, notwithstanding their business models. Even the 
average retail bank, which succeeded in remaining profitable despite the 
crisis, saw its earnings drop by more than two-thirds. However, the crisis 
had an uneven impact on the three business models. Due to their heavy 
trading losses in 2008, the wholesale banks obtained the worst profitability 
results, which have only been made worse by their negative return-on-
equity (RoE) and return-on-asset (RoA) in the years 2008 and 2009. 
Investment banks also suffered, with negative average returns in 2008 and 
almost zero (pre-tax) profits in 2009. However, their earnings conditions 
bounced back in 2009, putting them back into profitability.  
As another measure of performance, Table 5.6 provides the average 
cost efficiency of the three business models, as measured by the cost-to-
income ratio (CIR). According to these results, retail banks have obtained 
the best results, with a CIR of under 60%, which is substantially lower than 
the sample mean and the averages for the two other models. The wholesale 
and investment banks are statistically indistinguishable on this aspect, 
despite a sizeable difference in the average values.  
To sum up, the pre-crisis results on income sources confirm the 
expected characteristics of different business models. Much like in the rest 
of the literature, interest income is a predominant source of income for 
retail banks. Moreover, although the main contributor to the earnings of 
investment banks was trading income prior to the crisis, the fluctuating 
market conditions have made such a characterisation difficult. Wholesale 
banks clearly suffered substantially, mostly due to heavy trading losses in 
2008. This has positioned them substantially behind the earnings 
performance of their rivals. Put together with their superior cost-efficiency 
performances, retail banks have clearly out-performed their peers, despite 
lowered earnings, during the crisis.  
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5.2.3  Risks 
Table 5.7 Risks of business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All 
Z-score (std. dev. from default) a  31.123 **  9.645 **  6.808 **  17.395 
Risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
(% of assets) 
46.5% **  28.3% **  31.3% **  37.3% 
CDS spread 
(annual avg., basis points) 
61.147  61.253  61.402   61.239 
Stock returns volatility 
(std. dev. of daily returns) 
2.8% * 3.6% **  2.9% *  3.0% 
Tier 1 capital ratio 
(% of risk-weighted assets) 
8.3% * 8.7% **  8.5% *  8.5% 
Government support 
(guarantees or recap.) 
43.2% **  66.7% **  80.0% **  62.0% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations (unless otherwise noted) 
for the relevant sample. The independence of cluster sub-samples was tested using 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at the 5% level of 
significance. According to these tests, a single asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference 
from a single cluster, i.e. the furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) signify statistical 
difference from both clusters. 
a See Appendix II for calculation of z-score. 
We now turn to identifying the risks associated with the three 
business models. Table 5.7 provides the mean risk indicators for the three 
business models during the sampled period. Retail banks appear to be safer 
– but not in all measures. In particular, retail banks appear to be placed 
furthest from a potential default, i.e. low default likelihood, as evidenced 
by a high Z-score.30 The retail banks’ stock returns exhibit a low degree of 
volatility, statistically distinguishable from investment banks. Moreover, 
these banks were much less likely to receive government support, in the 
form of either liability guarantees or re-capitalisation/injection. In contrast, 
wholesale banks have the highest risks, with the lowest Z-scores – or 
highest default risks – among all models, which is backed by the amount of 
government support they received during the crisis.31 When it comes to 
                                                      
30 Since Z-scores are determined by the average and standard deviation of banks’ 
return-on-assets, the only part that changes over time is the ratio of equity over 
assets, or simply the capital ratio.  
31 The wholesale banks included in the sample consist mostly of the large, central 
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market measures, especially the average CDS spreads, the three models are 
less distinguishable, implying that the markets have not picked a particular 
model for its riskiness over the sampling period. 
How effective is the Z-score in measuring default likelihood? A look 
into the relationship between Z-score and government recapitalisation 
could be illuminating in assessing the indicator’s accuracy in measuring 
distress.32 In many cases, the authorities consider recapitalisation for banks 
that are facing financial difficulties, with a high likelihood of insolvency in 
the event of no intervention. This should mean that banks that receive no 
recapitalisation should be substantially safer (i.e. less likely to fail) than 
others. For other banks, Z-scores should be the lowest (pointing at a greater 
likelihood of default) in the year that recapitalisation is executed.  
Figure 5.8 Evolution of Z-score before, during and after recapitalisation 
 
Notes: Post- and pre-capitalisation periods exclude the year of recapitalisation, i.e. the year in 
which the capital was provided. Where multiple recapitalisations were made, the year 
of initial transaction was considered.  
                                                                                                                                       
institutions that provide liquidity and other functions for their cooperative and 
savings bank networks. Several studies have found that the smaller, retail 
cooperative and savings banks, which are not included in this study, have lower 
riskiness than their commercial peers in Europe (Čihák & Hesse, 2007; Ayadi et al., 
2009 and 2010).  
32 A similar look into government guarantees was not possible since the exact dates 
for which guarantees were provided were not available in some cases.  
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Figure 5.8 shows that banks that are never recapitalised are indeed 
much safer, with a high Z-score. This is particularly striking for the retail 
banks, whose default likelihoods are among the lowest in our sample. 
Moreover, for investment and wholesale banks that did receive 
recapitalisation, the default likelihoods behave exactly in the way 
hypothesised above. Indeed, Z-scores decline to an all-time low in the year 
that recapitalisation is made, implying greater default likelihoods, which 
most likely triggered the intervention. The conditions improve in the years 
following the recapitalisation. These results confirm that the Z-scores serve 
well as a measure of potential default likelihood, at least in our sample.33 
As for other risk measures, retail banks appear to have the highest 
risk-weights (i.e. risk-weighted assets, or RWA), as a share of total assets, 
presented in Figure 5.9a among the three business models, implying that 
the regulatory measure of their risks is higher. Figure 5.9b shows a lower 
Tier-1 capital ratio for retail banks, which implies that their loss absorption 
capacity (as defined by Tier-1 capital) is smaller than their peers, especially 
the investment banks which have statistically distinguishable ratios. The 
Tier-1 ratios have also improved over time, as banks had to increase their 
capital in line with the market expectations and, in some cases, due to the 
regulators’ insistence, especially in the case of banks that received 
government support and following the first stress test held by the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), or the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) under its new name, in July 2010.  
 
  
                                                      
33 Interestingly enough, the results are not found to be purely driven by the 
changing capital conditions. Indeed, in many cases, banks that were never 
recapitalised appear to also hold less capital (as a share of assets, risk-weighted 
assets, etc.) than their peers. This implies that other components of the Z-score 
contribute to explaining a substantial part of our results. For example, banks with 
low capital may be deemed safe if their earnings volatility is low and/or their 
mean earnings are high. 44 | RESULTS 
Figure 5.9 Evolution of regulatory indicators during crisis 
a) Risk-weighted assets (RWA) 
 
b) Tier-1 capital ratio 
 
Note: Risk-weighted assets are expressed as a percentage of total assets and Tier-1 capital 
ratio as a percentage of risk-weighted assets.  
So how can these seemingly conflicting results be reconciled? The 
differing results on Z-score, risk-weights and the CDS spreads merit deeper 
investigation. One way to explain these distinctions is that market 
measures tend to consider actual outcomes; the Z-score, on the other hand, 
measures inherent risks, which may not materialise if, say, the government 
steps in to bail out the banks. Indeed, the fact that CDS spreads are 
statistically indistinguishable for all banks seems to confirm that these 
dynamics are really at play. 
Figure 5.10 depicts the evolution of stock return volatility (a) and 
CDS spreads throughout the crisis (b). Both measures point at increased 
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risks, starting essentially from 2008. However, the figures show that the 
market has associated each model with more or less similar risks. This is 
particularly striking in the CDS spreads where all three models are 
associated with statistically indistinguishable risks. Therefore, it is likely 
that the market has already factored in the likelihood that no matter how 
risky they may inherently be, the EU’s top banks will be bailed out, 
possibly resulting in comparable risks for all institutions. These findings 
thus give support to the arguments on the elevation of moral hazard risks 
arising from missing or diluted market discipline in the presence of bank 
bail-outs, (Calomiris & Kahn, 1991; Rochet & Tirole, 1996; Diamond & 
Rajan, 2001). 
Figure 5.10 Evolution of market risk measures during crisis 
a) Stock return volatility 
 
b) Credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
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Notes: Stock return volatility in a) are expressed in standard deviations in stock returns, 
calculated by using daily closing prices. Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads in b) are 
expressed in average annual spreads, in basis points. 
Figure 5.11 Relationship between Z-score and RWA 
 
Notes: The letters R, I and W stand for the retail, investment and wholesale banking models. 
See Appendix II for details on the calculation of the Z-score. The coefficient estimate 
for RWA is significant at the 1% level. 
The conflict between the default risks as measured by the Z-score and 
the mean risk-weights is less easy to explain. Figure 5.11 shows a strong 
positive correlation between the two measures. Contrary to what one 
would expect, the diagram suggests that as the bank’s risk-weighted assets 
increase, implying a higher regulatory measure of risk, Z-score improves, 
implying a lower default likelihood. Why should banks with higher average 
risk-weights have much lower likelihood of default? 
One potential explanation of the interesting result in Figure 5.11 is 
that banks with more risky assets are required to hold more capital to 
absorb any potential losses. Indeed, the correlation between RWA and 
d i f f e r e n t  e q u i t y  m e a s u r e s  i s  v e r y  strong and positive in our sample, 
implying that most banks respond to a higher RWA by holding more 
capital.34 However, these adjustments should make banks with different 
                                                      
34 The correlation coefficients between RWA and different measures of equity (both 
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portfolio risks have comparable default risks.35 In other words, the 
additional capital should be at least proportional to the increase of RWA, 
leading to a more horizontal (i.e. insignificant) relationship than in Figure 
5.11. Moreover, Figure 5.12 shows that the relationship between Tier-1 
capital ratio and portfolio risks is negative and not positive. In short, the 
willingness to hold more capital does not seem to explain why banks with 
presumably riskier portfolios (as measured by RWA) appear safer.  
A more convincing answer to the question comes from a careful look 
into the business models depicted in Figure 5.11. All of the banks with high 
Z-scores and high RWA are retail banks. In turn, the banks on the other 
extreme of the relationship are more mixed, consisting mostly of 
investment and wholesale banks. It is therefore possible that some of these 
banks are engaging in regulatory arbitrage to ship risky assets off their 
balance sheets without actually transferring the risks, which is contributing 
to a low Z-score or proximity to default. The economics literature has only 
recently focused on analysing such practices in detail, identifying the use of 
structured products to achieve lower capital charges “without risk transfer” 
                                                                                                                                       
as % of assets), including tier-1 capital, common equity, tangible common equity, 
and total equity, are approximately 0.70, implying a very strong positive 
relationship between the two sets of measures. 
35 Although empirical research supports the presence of a strong positive 
correlation between portfolio risk and capital, the impact of capital requirements 
on banks’ default likelihood is far from clear (Shrieves & Dahl, 1992; Berger, 1995; 
Jacques & Nigro, 1997; Rime, 2001). The theoretical literature has suggested several 
explanations on why default probabilities may not be properly mitigated by capital 
requirements. Purely linear (i.e. un-weighted) capital requirements may increase 
bank failure likelihoods as risk-loving institutions reshuffle their portfolios in such 
a way to increase their overall risks (Kahane, 1977; Koehn & Santomero, 1980; Kim 
& Santomero, 1988). The use of improper or ‘incorrect’ risk-weights may also 
induce banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage and increase the likelihood of bank 
failure (Kim & Santomero, 1988; Rochet, 1992). Moreover, when limited liability is 
introduced, even the ‘correct’ risk-weighted capital requirements may not be 
sufficient to limit risk (Keeley & Furlong, 1990; Rochet, 1992). This is particularly 
the case for under-capitalised banks, where the shareholders may prefer to gamble 
the value of the bank by taking larger risks than they would in the absence of 
capital requirements. Lastly, more recent research has highlighted that higher 
capital may have the ‘unintended effect’ of allowing banks to take more tail risks 
while remaining compliant with regulatory requirements (Perotti et al., 2011).  48 | RESULTS 
(Acharya et al., 2010b).36 If true, these arguments would also mean that 
RWAs are not a good measure of a bank’s real risk exposures. 
Figure 5.12 Relationship between Tier-1 ratio and RWA 
 
Notes: The letters R, I and W stand for the retail, investment and wholesale banking models. 
The coefficient estimate for RWA is significant at the 1% level.  
T w o  f i n d i n g s  g i v e  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  i d e a  t h a t  R W A  m a y  b e  a n  
inaccurate measure that can be manipulated. First, in our sample there 
appears to be a weak (but statistically significant) negative relationship 
between earnings volatility and average risk weights. Indeed, Figure 5.13 
shows that the standard deviation of the RoA is negatively correlated to 
mean RWA values. Therefore, it is likely that risk-weights are not 
accurately measuring the underlying volatility of a bank’s earnings, which 
is a principle source of riskiness emanating from variability in returns from 
investments and loans. Second, Figure 5.14 confirms that some banks, 
especially those categorised under the investment banking model, may be 
using derivative transactions to reduce their RWA. The figure identifies the 
                                                      
36 Jones (2000, p. 48) also raised the possibility that “recent innovations in credit 
derivatives and the design of [credit loan obligations], together with additional 
capital arbitrage opportunities … are widely believed to afford large, sophisticated 
banks expanded opportunities for still further [regulatory capital arbitrage]”.  
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existence of a relatively strong and positive correlation between the use of 
derivatives transactions and lowered RWA.37 Provided that derivative 
transactions are an integral part of the construction and operation of 
structured products, the findings seem to give additional support to the 
idea that some of these activities may be used to reduce capital charges 
without adequately transferring risks. 
 
Figure 5.13 Relationship between earnings volatility and RWA 
 
Notes: The letters R, I and W stand for the retail, investment and wholesale banking models. 
The coefficient estimate for mean RWA is only significant at the 10% level (p-value = 
0.078). The diagram involves a reduced number of observations (sample size of 28) 
due to the use of standard deviation for the calculation of earnings volatility.  
 
 
 
                                                      
37 It is important to note these findings cannot be used to concretely build up 
evidence against a specific bank or a banking model. They only indicate a reason to 
suspect that regulatory arbitrage may be used. As is usually the case in any 
avoidance or illegal activity, concrete evidence is extremely hard to come by and 
requires a deep analysis and investigation, which is beyond the aims of this study.  
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Figure 5.14 Relationship between derivative transactions and RWA 
 
Notes: The letters R, I and W stand for the retail, investment and wholesale banking models. 
The coefficient estimate for total derivative exposures is significant at the 1% level. 
To sum up, the results reviewed in this section show that the retail 
banking model has been the least risky. Although some of the indicators 
are open to interpretation, these banks appear to have the least inherent 
risks, as captured by the default likelihood estimates. In line with these 
observations, the retail banks have received less support than their peers 
during the crisis. Wholesale banks appear to be the most risky business 
model, followed by investment banks. Market-based risk measures appear 
to draw a less contrasting picture of riskiness, most likely reflecting the 
anticipation of a bail-out. Moreover, risk-weighted assets appear to be 
doing a poor job in identifying risks, supporting arguments of the UK’s 
Independent Commission on Banking (2011, pp. 68-69). Some banks, 
including investment banks, may be taking advantage of this shortcoming 
by using derivative transactions to reduce their capital charges without 
achieving any risk transfer. However, a more convincing argument 
building on these issues requires a deeper and more detailed analysis, 
which is beyond the purpose of this study. 
5.2.4  Corporate governance 
The previous subsections have looked at the structure, performance and 
riskiness of the banking models identified in the study. This subsection 
turns to the distinct governance practices. The appropriateness and 
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effectiveness of these practices are hard to identify due to a number of 
reasons, including the unavailability of comparable data. Nevertheless, an 
effort was made to investigate a diverse set of indicators to distinguish the 
business models. 
Glancing through the indicators in Table 5.8, it is easy to see that 
some of the fundamental aspects of the three business models are 
confirmed by the findings. Retail banks spend more on audit fees, 
measured as a share of their assets. A substantial proportion of these fees 
(nearly one-third) are non-statutory fees, which predominantly take the 
form of fees from tax and legal advice. In turn, statutory audit fees 
represent nearly three-quarters of the total audit fees of investment banks 
and wholesale banks, implying their reliance on in-house legal and tax 
advice.  
Table 5.8 Audit fees and executive compensation practices of business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All 
Total audit fees 
(cents per ‘000 € of assets) 
4.1 **  3.2 **  2.4 **  3.2 
Statutory audit fees 
(cents per ‘000 € of assets) 
2.8 **  2.5 **  1.8 **  2.3 
Long-term bonus plan a  58.1% **  87.0% **  23.3% **  54.2% 
Formal option plan  81.4% * 78.3% * 30.0% **  64.6% 
Annual bonuses 
(% of annual pay) b 
39.7% **  31.1% * 30.4% *  34.7% 
Compensation committee  100.0% **  65.2% **  40.0% **  72.9% 
Notes: All figures correspond to cluster and sample means. 
a Long-term bonus plans are those that reward the CEOs with cash or shares, conditional on 
multiple-year performance criteria. 
b Share of annual bonus (excluding long-term bonuses) in total annual pay. The 
independence of cluster subsamples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-
parametric two-sample tests at the 5% level of significance. According to these tests, a single 
asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, i.e. the furthermost cluster; 
two asterisks (**) signify statistical difference from both clusters. 
Figure 5.15 shows that total audit fees appear to have converged 
during the crisis. In particular, while retail banks have continually reduced 
the fees they pay (as a share of their assets). Meanwhile, the opposite holds 
for investment and wholesale banks. In particular, the total audit fees of 
wholesale banks increased by over 30% in 2009, mostly due to new non-
statutory fees that may reflect the banks’ troubles.  52 | RESULTS 
Figure 5.15 Evolution of total audit fees during crisis 
 
Note: All figures are expressed in € per €1,000 of assets. 
For the sampled banks’ executive compensation practices, Table 5.8 
shows that wholesale banks are more likely to have traditional salary 
packages, consisting mostly of fixed pay. Interestingly, all retail banks and 
most investment banks have executive compensation boards. This finding 
could be explained by both types of banks’ extensive use of long-term 
compensation plans. In particular, nearly all of the investment banks have 
some form of long-term bonus plans, which are all performance related. 
The use of options is also prevalent in the two business models. Over time, 
all banks have reduced the share of annual bonuses in total annual pay 
(Figure 5.16). This is largely in line with the developments in the aftermath 
of the crisis and the public scrutiny of executive compensation. 
Figure 5.16 Evolution of annual bonuses during crisis 
 
Note: Figures represent share of annual bonus (excluding long-term bonuses) in total annual 
pay. 
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Table 5.9 Ownership attributes of business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All 
Shareholder value (SHV) bank  90.9% **  70.8% **  37.5% **  66.7% 
Cooperative bank  9.1% **  0.0% **  27.5% **  13.9% 
Savings bank  0.0% **  16.7% **  30.0% **  14.8% 
State-owned bank a  0.0% **  29.2% * 25.0% *  15.7% 
Private block owners (% owned) b  14.4% **  4.5% **  40.1% **  21.7% 
Listed on stock exchange  90.9% **  79.2% **  47.5% **  72.2% 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
The independence of cluster subsamples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney non-parametric two-sample tests at 5% significance. According to these tests, 
a single asterisk (*) signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, i.e. the 
furthermost cluster; two asterisks (**) signify statistical difference from both clusters. 
a At least 50% owned by public authorities. 
b Private block owners are those that own more than a 5% stake, excluding the stakes of 
domestic public authorities.  
Turning to banks’ ownership structure, Table 5.9 shows that retail 
banks are more likely than their peers to be listed on the stock exchange, 
owned by their private shareholders. Indeed, more than 90% of all retail 
banks are listed. A substantial majority of the banks categorised as 
investment banks are also listed. Wholesale banks are the most mixed 
group, half comprising a more or less equivalent proportion of 
shareholder-value, cooperative and savings banks. More than half of these 
banks are unlisted on the stock exchanges.  
Block ownership by private shareholders (i.e. shareholders with a 
minimum stake of 5%) also shows a substantial variation. On the one hand 
are wholesale banks in which the total stakes of block owners is nearly 40%, 
representing a substantial concentration of voting power and control. To a 
large extent, the predominance of block ownership in wholesale banks is 
due to the categorisation of a number of central network cooperative and 
savings institutions in this group. Unlike their commercial banks, these 
banks tend to be collectively owned by the local banks to which that they 
provide liquidity and other centralised services.38 
                                                      
38 See Appendix III for individual bank cases involving central institutions. Also, 
see the discussion on the role of central institutions in cooperative banking 
networks in Ayadi et al. (2010, pp. 17-24).  54 | RESULTS 
Public authorities do not own any one of the retail banks in our 
sample. This is an interesting finding since the clustering analysis, which 
did not consider any one of the ownership attributes, managed to clearly 
distinguish a group of banks that are entirely privately-owned. In turn, 
approximately one-quarter of all wholesale and investment banks are state-
owned. As Figure 5.17 clearly depicts, some of the publicly-owned 
investment and wholesale banks are those that are nationalised or partly-
nationalised due to their troubles during the crisis. Nevertheless, the figure 
shows that state-ownership was common in these two models even before 
the crisis. 
Figure 5.17 Evolution of state ownership during crisis 
 
Notes: All figures are the mean values for the year-end observations for the relevant sample. 
State ownership is defined as a minimum 50% ownership. None of the retail banks 
were state-owned in the sample period. 
To sum up, an assessment of governance practices does not reveal 
any particular strengths or weaknesses of the business models. Retail banks 
appear to use more legal and tax advice externally although the differences 
between the business models have diminished during the crisis. In terms of 
executive compensation, wholesale banks use more fixed pay while both 
retail and investment banks provide long-term packages. The use of annual 
bonuses has declined substantially during the crisis; however, more 
information on other packages is needed to assess fully whether this is 
equivalent to a more predominant use of fixed pay. In terms of their 
ownership structures, retail banks are more likely to be listed on the stock 
exchange. Wholesale banks are more likely to be ‘central network 
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institutions’,39 which are owned by their local savings or cooperative 
institutions. Lastly, public ownership, which does not apply to any of the 
retail banks, has increased in recent years for wholesale and investment 
banks due to nationalisations.  
5.2.5  Disclosure practices 
The last area for the evaluation of the different business models is 
disclosure practices. The data for constructing the relevant measures come 
from the database that forms the basis of this study. A number of variables 
were chosen from a set of categories that span across the banks’ financial 
performance, financial position, risk exposure, accounting policies and 
governance practices. The indicators are typically used by the IMF and the 
World Bank to evaluate banks’ soundness.40 
Table 5.10 provides an overview of the indicators used to construct 
the transparency indices. Most of the indicators have been used throughout 
this report. Others have not been presented, in many cases due to low 
coverage ratios. More in detail, the variables relating to financial 
performance assess the profitability, cost-efficiency and income sources of 
the banks. The variables related to financial position provide an 
understanding of the main strategies and conditions of the bank, focusing 
mainly on capital conditions. Risk exposure variables provide an 
understanding of where the main risks lie. Accounting and governance 
policies are more descriptive and provide a general understanding of the 
relevant topics. 
It is important to note that some of the indicators discussed in the 
study have not been included in the list of variables. In particular, the 
variables were chosen based on their availability. For example, variables 
such as total assets, type of ownership, total net income, total customer 
deposits, etc. are standard and are not considered part of the transparency 
measure. Other variables that could prove useful, such as term structure of 
deposits (sight, time, etc.), debt maturity, etc., were not included since most 
banks did not report such data.41 In short, the indicators were built just to 
                                                      
39 See Ayadi et al. ( 2010) for more on this concept.  
40 See World Bank/IMF (2005) for an overview.  
41 As a general rule, no variable with less than 10% coverage was included in the 
transparency indicator. 56 | RESULTS 
allow a comparison of the different models in this study and not to serve as 
a stand-alone measure of transparency. 
Table 5.10 Variables used for assessing data disclosure 
Category Variable  Category  Variable 
Financial 
performance 
Return on assets (RoA) 
Return on equity (RoE) 
Cost-to-income ratio (CIR) 
Interest margin 
Non-interest income 
Income tax 
Risk 
exposure 
Loans to banks 
Loans to customers 
Loans to public authorities 
Domestic assets 
Derivatives, positive fair value 
Derivatives, negative fair value 
Cash and balances with central 
bank 
Reverse repurchase agreements 
Repurchase agreements 
Financial 
position 
Risk-weighted assets 
Total regulatory capital 
Tier 1 capital 
Tier 2 capital 
Tier 3 capital 
Subordinated debt 
Goodwill 
Common equity 
Tangible common equity 
Common leverage ratio 
Issuance of new shares 
Accounting 
policies 
Accounting firm 
Accounting method 
Total audit fee 
Statutory audit fee 
Governance 
practices 
Annual bonuses 
Compensation committee 
Corporate social responsibility 
report 
 
Table 5.11 provides a comparison of the three models in terms of their 
data disclosure practices. All banks are relatively open about their financial 
performances. Most banks, especially the listed entities, are forthcoming to 
make their performance public. Investment banks are more transparent in 
the aggregate, in particular in disclosing data on their financial positions 
and risk exposures. In turn, wholesale banks are less transparent, especially 
in their governance practices. Retail banks are in between these two 
models, providing the most information on their governance practices.  
Glancing generally over the figures, the most striking result is 
possibly the lack of detailed information on risk exposures. Despite the 
intention to choose non-trivial variables, the annual reports and financial 
statements of most banks contain very little detailed information on the risk 
exposures of banks. What is more, it is very hard to distinguish the banks 
based on their business models. Indeed, with the exception of financial 
position, all categories include some statistical ties, i.e. cases where the 
performances of two business models are not significantly different.  BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 57 
Table 5.11 Data disclosure practices of business models 
 Retail  Investment  Wholesale  All  
Financial performance  99.1%* 96.6%** 99.2%*  98.6% 
Financial position  79.7%**  84.9%** 74.1%**  78.8% 
Risk exposure  50.4%* 56.1%** 52.9%*  52.6% 
Accounting policies  89.4%* 84.7%*  97.5%**  91.4% 
Governance  88.3%* 85.4%*  64.6%**  78.9% 
ALL CATEGORIES  72.0%**  74.2%** 68.8%**  71.3% 
Notes: All figures correspond to cluster and sample means. The independence of cluster 
subsamples was tested using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non-parametric two-
sample tests at the 5% level of significance. According to these tests, a single asterisk 
(*) signifies statistical difference from a single cluster, i.e. the furthermost cluster; two 
asterisks (**) signify statistical difference from both clusters. 
Although recent amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD) have addressed disclosure requirements on securitisation and 
remuneration policies, our data collection reveals that public information 
on even the simplest variables is incomplete. This is particularly the case 
for risk exposures, which is contributing to the low score of our sample. For 
example, only 28% of the sampled banks report the share of total loans to 
public bodies. Moreover, only half of the banks make any distinction 
between domestic and international loans. It is important to note that lack 
of adequate disclosure on risk exposure is not limited to the variables 
included in Table 5.10 or covered by the database for the study. For 
example, although an EU-wide standard on the definition of SMEs is 
available (Recommendation 2003/361/EC), loans to SMEs are not a 
standard part of public disclosures of banks. Most banks do not report any 
information on their currency exposures, not to mention their international 
exposures. In addition, maturities are likewise rarely available of 
underlying assets and liabilities, which are set to become an important part 
of the regulatory framework proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) under the Basel III.42  
                                                      
42 Citing similar difficulties with data availability, IMF (2011, p. 78) notes that it 
could not evaluate the liquidity coverage ratio proposed by the BCBS under Basel 
III “because it required information on the credit quality, ratings, and liquidity 
characteristics of the ratio’s so-called Level II assets—such as covered bonds, rated 
corporate bonds, and agency debt—that are not publicly available”.  58 | RESULTS 
As another sticking point, there appears to be little congruity in the 
information that is made public. Even simple items, such as loans to and 
deposits from customers, may cover different counterparties, excluding or 
including other financial institutions. Similarly, many banks did not 
provide consistent data on their full-time equivalent headcounts. As 
another example, cash and cash-like assets were treated differently, in some 
cases not properly distinguishing them from reserves at the national central 
banks. There was also no homogeneity on the definition of non-performing 
loans, i.e. arrears, doubtful loans, repossessions, etc., which undermines the 
comparability of any available information.  
To sum up, the results suggest that transparency could be improved 
substantially if banks were required to disclose more (standardised) 
information on their risk exposure and financial position. Although it is 
hard to single out any specific model, wholesale banks can also be required 
to reveal more information on their governance practices, in particular 
details on their executive compensation.  59 | 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
o summarise the main results, the banks that are identified as falling 
within the ‘retail banking model’ are those institutions that are the 
least leveraged and have taken fewer risks, while performing 
comparably and with better governance practices than their peers. Most of 
these institutions are commercially-owned, i.e. ‘shareholder-value’ (SHV) 
institutions, providing traditional services, such as retail deposits and 
loans, to the general public. Although most of the banks that received state 
aid have agreed to reorient their activities towards a more retail banking 
model, our results do not show that this has taken place. In fact, many retail 
banks have moved closer to wholesale and investment banking models in 
recent years.  
Investment banks are also the mostly commercially-oriented. These 
banks are among the most leveraged (i.e. low proportion of tangible 
common equity to total assets) and engage extensively in trading activities 
while relying on short-term funding and lending, such as repos and reverse 
repos transactions. Most provide long-term bonus plans or option plans to 
their executives. The investment banks’ performance has fluctuated 
substantially during the crisis. As a consequence, many have received 
extensive state support or have become nationalised. However, their 
trading losses have been moderate and earnings appear to have bounced 
back in 2009.  
Wholesale banks have a more mixed ownership structure, comprising 
many cooperative or savings central network institutions. Owing to the 
nature of their activities, most of these banks specialise in wholesale 
banking, providing services to public sector entities, other financial 
institutions and large and middle-sized corporations. The wholesale banks 
have performed remarkably worse than their peers according to many 
measures, many receiving some form o f  s t a t e  s u p p o r t  o r  b e c o m i n g  
nationalised in the years 2008 and 2009. Interestingly, trading losses (and 
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cost-inefficiencies) were the main explanatory factors for these results. 
Apart from showing the severity of the conditions faced by wholesale 
banks, the results also called into question the economic wisdom of 
diversifying into these non-core areas of activity.  
An interesting finding that emerges from the study is that market-
based indicators of risk, such as CDS spreads, cannot be used to distinguish 
between the underlying risks faced by the three banking models. It appears 
that the moral hazard issues that arise from the potential for state support 
for too-big-to-fail institutions may bias market-based measures, rendering 
them less useful for regulatory purposes or for identifying underlying risks 
for each bank. Moreover, there is no coherent relationship between the 
estimates of likely default derived from banks’ financial statements and the 
risk-weights applied in compliance with regulatory requirements. In short, 
the results raise concerns over the use of different measures of risk. A more 
detailed study of bank riskiness was not possible due to the limited amount 
of data available.  
Several observations can be made concerning the impact of upcoming 
regulations in light of the findings of this study.  
First, the results provide some justification to the recent popularised 
view that the retail banking model is safer than the others. Despite their 
commercial orientation and their size, these banks were safer than their 
peers and have performed relatively well before, during and after the crisis. 
Our findings also point to some weaknesses of the institutions in the 
investment banking model, which tend to rely on less stable funding 
sources, engage heavily in trading activities and maintain a very low share 
of loss-absorbing capital compared to the other two models (i.e. common 
tangible capital) despite comparable Tier-1 ratios. In turn, the wholesale 
banking group appears to be the most risky, possibly arising from a lower 
share of liquid assets and a greater use of more volatile interbank funding. 
In this sense, the capital requirements that focus on more loss-absorbing 
capital, especially in the definition of leverage ratios, and on the use of 
more traditional forms of funding and liquidity management (such as the 
net stable funding ratio – NFSR) could be useful in reducing the inherent 
risks in banking.  
Second, the fact that most of the banks in our sample, including 
nearly half of the retail banks, have received government support in one 
form or another is likely to invite moral hazard problems. Indeed, although 
various measures point to differing underlying risks, the market’s pricing 
of default probabilities (via CDS spreads) are virtually identical on average BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 61 
for the three business models. This implies that the market participants see 
no reason to distinguish between the inherent risks of different business 
models, possibly in anticipation of the eventual government support that 
the sampled banks would receive. These findings call for a serious 
investigation into the use of additional capital charges for “systemically 
important financial institutions” or SIFIs. Implementing a Financial 
Stability Contribution (FSC), as proposed by the IMF (2010) and partly 
supported by the European Commission (COM(2010) 254), to internalise 
the cost of crises and facilitate crisis management in the EU may also 
address the risks arising from ‘too-big-to-fail’ institutions.  
Third, a heavy reliance on risk-adjusted capital requirements may be 
misguided since the risk-weights appear to be unrelated, and even 
inversely linked, to underlying risks. Although the results of the study 
have to be interpreted with care, there is concern that certain banks may 
use their specialisation in trading activities to offload some of the riskier 
portions of their assets from their balance sheets without actually reducing 
their inherent risks. This gives additional justification for the use of simple 
rules, such as the proposed leverage ratio as called for under the Basel III 
framework.43  
Fourth, it is necessary for banks to disclose more information publicly 
and in a coherent manner. In particular, there is little information on details 
regarding their activities, in particular their risk exposures to different 
sectors, customer classes and off-balance sheet entities. For investors and 
deposit-holders to engage in proper monitoring of the banks, more relevant 
disclosure is needed on these items. Although some banks provide 
extensive information on these items, the data are far from comparable. 
Standardisation and reinforcement of disclosure requirements for a core set 
of items in line with international accounting standards could be very 
useful in allowing investors to obtain a proper understanding of the risks 
and to make comparisons between different financial institutions. In this 
sense, it may be advisable to give new impetus to the required use of 
electronic standards, such as the XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language) in supervisory reporting. Another policy that can enhance the 
availability of reliable information on banks is the public dissemination of 
supervisory data, as is the case for many banks in the US.  
                                                      
43 An alternative would be to oblige banks to hold much more capital than is 
currently required. Indeed, a recent study has found that the socially ‘optimal’ 
capital requirement would be around 20% of the RWA (Miles et al., 2011). 62 | CONCLUSIONS 
Lastly, the one-time monitoring exercise undertaken by this study is 
bound to be incomplete, especially in view of the missing post-crisis data. 
Among other elements that need to be monitored, one important issue that 
deserves attention is the extent to which the banks that received state aid 
re-orient themselves towards other models. Moreover, it could be useful to 
enlarge the scope of the study to a larger set of banks and to extend the 
research back further to the early 2000s, all in an attempt to acquire a 
deeper understanding of the pre- and post-crisis evolution of the banking 
models. For these purposes, the current study may well serve as a first step 
towards a more regular monitoring of the EU’s banking sector.  
The following table summarises the main policy recommendations 
presented above. 
Table 6.1 Main recommendations of the study 
Observations Recommended policy responses 
Highly leveraged institutions and 
wide discrepancies in loss-absorbing 
capital  
Introduce leverage ratio and focus more 
on loss-absorbing capital definition as 
proposed under Basel III framework 
Excessive reliance on short-term 
funding in investment and 
wholesale-oriented banks 
Introduce incentives for stable funding, 
i.e. NFSR and liquidity ratio under Basel 
III framework 
Market does not distinguish between 
business models despite notable 
differences in risks 
Require more capital from SIFIs and/or 
implement FSC charges to banks to 
address ‘too-big-to-fail’ risks 
Risk-weighted assets may not be 
linked to underlying risks and may 
be manipulated 
Supplement current approach with un-
weighted capital requirements, i.e. 
leverage ratio under Basel III framework 
Incomplete and incoherent 
disclosure in public statements, 
especially on risk exposure 
Consider giving impetus to the 
implementation of standard disclosure 
formats, i.e. XBRL, and public 
dissemination of supervisory data as in 
the US 
Missing post-crisis data and 
changing business models 
Initiate regular monitoring exercise 63 | 
 
 
7.  CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS OF 
BANKS IN THE POST-CRISIS ERA 
he evolution of European banking and its business models over the 
coming years is likely to be dominated by the legacy of the crisis and 
the regulatory and supervisory responses to it. Our analysis suggests 
that the aftermath of the crisis will be transformational in four major 
dimensions: 1) the size and growth of the banking industry, 2) in bank 
business models, 3) with respect to financial system structure and above all, 
4) in all aspects of the regulatory regime.  
Regarding the relative size of the banking industry, it is likely that the 
banking industry is entering a period of slower growth than in the years 
prior to the onset of the crisis. This is largely because the ‘excess 
financialisation’ and the factors giving rise to it, noted in section 2, are 
likely to be reversed, not the least because it proved to be unsustainable. 
Two reasons for this will be the unwinding of some of the factors that 
previously induced the unsustainable growth trends of the past – most 
especially the requirement for banks to hold more equity capital – and the 
likelihood that the cost of capital will also rise as, in some respects, the cost 
of capital was artificially low in the period before the crisis. Banks are also 
likely to give more rigorous attention to the risk characteristics of their 
business. As banks adjust to a regime of higher capitalisation, the de-
leveraging process will impact on the growth of bank lending. These 
factors will influence the growth of banking on the supply side of the 
equation. If, as argued below, banking will become more expensive for a 
wide range of customers, slower growth may also emanate from the 
demand side. In many ways, some aspects of banking (including risk) were 
significantly under-priced and this is likely to be reversed. Overall, 
therefore, banks across Europe will give more attention to the risk 
characteristics of their business models and in the pricing of risk. 
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As a result of these changes, there will inevitably be some 
‘displacement’ of business that was previously channelled through the 
balance sheet of banks. This is likely to include more business gravitating to 
the capital market which, in its turn, will change some aspects of bank 
business models, as some banks will be in a position to facilitate their 
corporate customers making debt issues in the markets and assisting 
customers’ capital market operations in various other ways. While the 
securitisation market is largely closed at present, this is likely to be a 
temporary phenomenon and banks will again seek to securitise some of 
their lending – albeit (and partly under regulatory pressure) in different 
ways than in the past, most especially with respect to their having to retain 
at least some of the credit risk. Another phenomenon that may grow in the 
future is the institutional cash pools from the demand-side perspective.44 
Today, although these new forms of shadow banking seem to prioritise 
safety and diversification over yield, this may not be the case in the future.  
With regard specifically to business models, it is likely that there will 
be some reversion to more traditional banking models with, for instance, a 
greater emphasis on the more stable retail funding of banks’ balance sheet 
positions in combination with lesser reliance than in the pre-crisis period 
on wholesale funding activities. The regulatory demand for banks to 
become more liquid will itself encourage a greater focus on retail funding 
as well as a requirement to hold more liquid assets on the balance sheet. It 
is generally regarded that too little attention (including by regulators) has 
been given to the liquidity aspects of banks’ business operations.  
It is also likely that banks will come under pressure (not least from 
regulators) to operate with less complex business structures. This can be 
seen, for instance, in the requirement to create living wills so that key parts 
of a banking business can be ring-fenced and more easily resolvable in the 
event of a bank becoming distressed. This is part of a strategy in the 
evolving regulatory regime to be able to manage the resolution of 
distressed banks in a more orderly, coherent, timely and predictable 
manner.  
If, as argued, banking will become less expansionary compared with 
the pre-crisis period, it is also likely that banking will become more 
expensive, partly because of the higher regulatory costs (capital, etc.), but 
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also because more realistic and sustainable risk pricing is likely to emerge. 
It is also feasible that some banks will become more risk averse. 
Overall, it is unlikely that banking will be as profitable in the coming 
years as it appeared to be in the pre-crisis period although, to a large 
extent, this was largely illusory because risk was being under-priced and 
many of the banking strategies that emerged in the previous period proved 
to be unsustainable. This is not to say that the current relatively low 
profitability will not be reversed, but rather that profitability is not likely to 
regain its pre-crisis levels. All this in turn suggests that banks will be under 
ever more pressure to manage their costs and this, in the course of time, is 
likely to induce more consolidation in the European banking industry so as 
to gain alleged economies of scale. 
As hinted at in an earlier chapter, a major driving force in the future 
evolution and business models and strategies of banks will be regulation 
and supervision. In some senses this could be the dominant driver in the 
coming years as banks are forced to adjust to a more demanding regulatory 
and supervisory environment. Predictably, banks are already raising 
concerns about the potential costs of regulation and not the least those that 
allegedly derive from higher capital (most especially equity) requirements. 
Just as the crisis has been the most severe and far-reaching than for many 
decades (with some arguing, for instance the chairman of the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority, that it has been the most serious banking 
crisis “in the history of capitalism”), so it is likely that it will induce one of 
the most substantial sets of changes ever in the regulatory and supervisory 
regime. The changes will be far-reaching and will include, inter alia: 
•  The requirement to hold more capital, especially equity capital, 
•  Enhanced loss-absorbing capability including bail-ins, contingent 
capital, etc. 
•  A minimum leverage ratio on top of the risk-weighted capital 
requirements, 
•  Differential (higher) capital requirements imposed on banks that are 
deemed to be systemically significant with the implication that large 
banks will need to hold more capital than other institutions and 
•  More onerous liquidity requirements. 
Overall, these requirements are likely to induce slower growth in 
banking, higher costs and lower profitability. 
As well as formal regulatory requirements, banks will also be subject 
to more intensive and extensive supervision. There will be increased 66 | CHANGING BUSINESS MODELS OF BANKS IN THE POST-CRISIS ERA 
supervisory attention to banks’ business models and a greater focus on 
testing banks’ risk models and their risk analysis and management 
systems. Supervisors are likely to become more interventionist in their 
approach, which will include judgements about business models, the way 
that business models are managed and operated, and banks’ internal 
incentive structures especially with regard to bonus payments and how 
they are calculated. Several supervisory agencies have already announced 
that they will monitor the extent to which internal reward structures create 
incentives for excessive risk-taking. There will also likely be more attention 
given to governance arrangements within banks including monitoring the 
expertise of senior bankers. The latter was cited by the incoming head of 
the UK’s prudential agency at a public meeting in London on 19 May 2011. 
Business models will also likely change as the centre of gravity in the 
world economy shifts most especially regarding the continued growth of 
emerging market economies, which will create new business opportunities 
and strategies for some banks. 
All these pressures will impact differently on different banks 
according to their business profiles. Whilst it is impossible to predict 
precisely how business models will change for different types of banks, 
there is little doubt that the implications will be substantial. Our 
judgement, however, is that European banking will not converge on a 
single business model. Diversity will remain with the spectrum of models 
including fully-diversified banks, comprehensive financial conglomerates, 
retail financial conglomerates, core-cluster institutions, specialist banks, 
niche-segmentation institutions, joint ventures, etc. 67 | 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS  Bank for International Settlements 
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation 
CDS  Credit default swap 
CEBS  Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
CIR Cost-to-income  ratio 
CNI  Central Network Institutions 
CRD  Capital Requirements Directive 
EBA  European Banking Authority 
FSC  Financial Stability Contribution 
NFSR  Net stable funding ratio 
OTC Over-the-counter 
RoA  Return on assets 
RoE  Return on equity 
RWA Risk-weighted  assets 
SHV Shareholder-value 
SIFI  Systemically important financial institution 
SIVs  Structured investment vehicle 
SPV  Special purpose vehicle 
TBTF Too-big-to-fail 
XBRL  eXtensible Business Reporting Language 
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APPENDIX I. 
LIST OF VARIABLES COLLECTED 
No. Variable  Coverage No. Variable  Coverage 
1 Country (headquarter location)  100%  32 Share price (daily return)  67% 
2 Reporting currency  100%  33 Share price (st. dev. daily return)  67% 
3 Accounting method  100%  34 Share price (market Beta)  67% 
4 Annual report (pages)  100%  35 Share price (interest Beta)  67% 
5 Accounting date (end of year)  100%  36 Employees (FTEs)  65% 
6 Annual Report (approval date)  96%  37 Employees (FTEs - Male)  21% 
7 Accounting firm  100%  38 Employees (FTEs - Female)  21% 
8 Total accounting fee  90%  39 Employees (headcount)  56% 
9 Total non-audit fee  88%  40 Employees (headcount - Male)  25% 
10 Ownership (SHV/STV)  100%  41 Employees (headcount - Female)  25% 
11 Ownership (cooperative, 
savings...) 
100%  42 Employees (domestic)  69% 
12 Public ownership (%)  100%  43 Employees (other EU27 countries)  38% 
13 Public ownership (domestic %)  100%  44 Employees (outside EU27)  69% 
14 Public ownership (domestic 
name) 
31%  45 Employees (training hours)  29% 
15 Public ownership (other EU27 
%) 
100%  46 Employees (training employees)  19% 
16 Public ownership (other EU27 
name) 
7%  47 Branches (total)  92% 
17 Public ownership (outside EU27 
%) 
100%  48 Branches (domestic)  83% 
18 Public ownership (outside EU27 
name) 
8%  49 Branches (other EU27 countries)  47% 
19 Largest shareholder (% 
ownership) 
90%  50 Branches (outside EU27)  76% 
20 Largest shareholder (name)  94%  51 ATMs (total)  31% 
21 Block holder ownership (>5%)  87%  52 ATMs (domestic)  25% 
22 Block holder ownership (>3%)  63%  53 ATMs (other EU27 countries)  14% 
23 Listed (YES/NO)  100%  54 ATMs (outside EU27)  11% 
24 Ordinary shares (outstanding)  72%  55 Assets (total)  100% 
25 Ordinary shares (traded)  66%  56 Assets (domestic)  56% 
26 Market capitalisation  72%  57 Cash (and balances with central 
banks) 
100% 
27 Value of traded shares  66%  58 Assets (central bank)  60% 
28 Gross dividend  72%  59 Loans to banks (total)  100% 
29 Share price (year end)  72%  60 Loans to banks (nostro accounts / on 
demand) 
27% 
30 Share price (average)  67%  61 Loans to banks (loan loss provision)  58% 
31 Share price (standard deviation)  67%  62 Loans to customers (total)  96% 76 | APPENDIX I. LIST OF VARIABLES COLLECTED 
No. Variable  Coverage No. Variable  Coverage 
63 Loans to customers (public 
sector) 
28%  94 CDS spread (subordinated, 
volatility) 
62% 
64 Loans to customers (mortgage 
loans) 
51%  95 Income (total)  100% 
65 Loans to customers (loan loss 
provision) 
69%  96 Income (interest - net)  100% 
66 Loans to customers (collective 
impairment) 
22%  97 Income (interest - income)  94% 
67 Loans to customers (specific 
impairment) 
22%  98 Income (interest - expenses)  94% 
68 Intangible assets  100%  99 Income (non-interest)  100% 
69 Goodwill 100%  100 Income (commissions - net)  100% 
70 Reverse repurchase agreements  89%  101 Income (commissions - income)  91% 
71 Liabilities (total)  100%  102 Income (commissions - expenses)  91% 
72 Liabilities (domestic)  27%  103 Income (trading - net)  98% 
73 Liabilities (banks incl. central 
banks) 
96%  104 Income (dividend)  38% 
74 Deposits (banks)  72%  105 Income (insurance - net)  74% 
75 Deposits (domestic banks)  27%  106 Income (insurance - income)  72% 
76 Deposits (central banks)  44%  107 Income (insurance - expenses)  72% 
77 Deposits (banks - demand)  46%  108 Income (other)  94% 
78 Deposits (banks - term)  43%  109 Expenses (operating - total)  100% 
79 Liabilities (customers)  96%  110 Expenses (operating - 
administrative) 
99% 
80 Deposits (customers)  80%  111 Expenses (operating - personal)  93% 
81 Deposits (domestic customers)  42%  112 Expenses (operating - personal 
training) 
27% 
82 Deposits (customers - term and 
time deposits) 
54%  113 Expenses (operating - other)  93% 
83 Deposits (customers - current 
accounts and demand) 
46%  114 Expenses (operating - depreciations)  99% 
84 Deposits (customers - savings)  55%  115 Profit (before tax)  100% 
85 Repurchase agreements 
(liabilities) 
92%  116 Income tax  100% 
86 Short-selling position (total)  63%  117 Profit (after tax)  100% 
87 Short-selling position (equity)  7%  118 Risk-weighted assets (total)  87% 
88 Short-selling position (debt)  7%  119 Risk-weighted assets (off balance 
sheet) 
16% 
89 CDS spread (senior, year end)  69%  120 Risk-weighted assets (credit risk)  36% 
90 CDS spread (senior, average)  69%  121 Risk-weighted assets (market risk)  36% 
91 CDS spread (senior, volatility)  69%  122 Risk-weighted assets (operational 
risk) 
30% 
92 CDS spread (subordinated, year 
end) 
62%  123 Risk-weighted assets (business risk)  10% 
93 CDS spread (subordinated, 
average) 
62%  124 Capital (regulatory capital)  93% 
     125 Capital (tier I - total)  93% 
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No. Variable  Coverage No. Variable  Coverage 
126 Capital (tier I - core)  27%  152 Derivatives (total - nominal value)  22% 
127 Capital (tier I - hybrid)  56%  153 Derivatives (total - notional value)  55% 
128 Capital (tier II - total)  76%  154 Derivatives (total - notional value - 
receive) 
14% 
129 Capital (tier II - subordinated 
liabilities) 
27%  155 Derivatives (total - notional value - 
deliver) 
14% 
130 Capital (tier II - hybrid)  15%  156 Derivatives (total - fair value - 
positive) 
95% 
131 Capital (tier III - total)  76%  157 Derivatives (total - fair value - 
negative) 
95% 
132 Capital (equity - total)  100%  158 Derivatives (interest - nominal 
value) 
22% 
133 Capital (equity - shareholders)  100%  159 Derivatives (interest - notional 
value) 
55% 
134 Capital (equity - minority 
interest) 
100%  160 Derivatives (interest - notional value 
- receive) 
14% 
135 Capital (equity - special 
securities) 
100%  161 Derivatives (interest - notional value 
- deliver) 
14% 
136 Capital (equity - hybrid)  100%  162 Derivatives (interest - fair value - 
positive) 
92% 
137 Capital (equity - subordinated 
liabilities) 
100%  163 Derivatives (interest - fair value - 
negative) 
92% 
138 Capital (equity - hybrid)  100%  164 Derivatives (currency - nominal 
value) 
22% 
139 Capital (tangible common 
equity) 
100%  165 Derivatives (currency - notional 
value) 
55% 
140 Capital (common equity)  100%  166 Derivatives (currency - notional 
value - receive) 
14% 
141 Capital (common stock)  96%  167 Derivatives (currency - notional 
value - deliver) 
14% 
142 Capital (additional paid-in 
capital) 
96%  168 Derivatives (currency - fair value - 
positive) 
92% 
143 Capital (retained earnings)  100%  169 Derivatives (currency - fair value - 
negative) 
92% 
144 Capital (treasury shares)  98%  170 Derivatives (equity - nominal value)  22% 
145 Capital (non-recognised losses)  99%  171 Derivatives (equity - notional value)  55% 
146 Capital (subscribed capital - 
issuance) 
100%  172 Derivatives (equity - notional value - 
receive) 
14% 
147 Capital (non-common equity - 
issuance) 
100%  173 Derivatives (equity - notional value - 
deliver) 
14% 
148 Rating (DBRS)  19%  174 Derivatives (equity - fair value - 
positive) 
92% 
149 Rating (Fitch)  69%  175 Derivatives (equity - fair value - 
negative) 
92% 
150 Rating (Moody's)  80%  176 Derivatives (credit - nominal value)  22% 
151 Rating (S&P)  79%  177 Derivatives (credit - notional value)  55% 
     178 Derivatives (credit - notional value - 
receive) 
18% 
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No. Variable  Coverage  No. Variable  Coverage 
179  Derivatives (credit - 
notional value - deliver) 
18%  191  Derivatives (hedging - notional 
value) 
30% 
180  Derivatives (credit - fair 
value - positive) 
93%  192  Derivatives (hedging - fair value - 
positive) 
78% 
181  Derivatives (credit - fair 
value - negative) 
92%  193  Derivatives (hedging - fair value - 
negative) 
78% 
182  Derivatives (FX - nominal 
value) 
15%  194  Derivatives (trading - notional 
value - receive) 
11% 
183  Derivatives (FX - notional 
value) 
27%  195  Derivatives (trading - notional 
value - deliver) 
11% 
184  Derivatives (FX - fair value - 
positive) 
37%  196  Derivatives (trading - fair value - 
positive) 
79% 
185  Derivatives (FX - fair value - 
negative) 
37%  197  Derivatives (trading - fair value - 
negative) 
78% 
186  Derivatives (OTC - nominal 
value) 
19%  198  Asset-backed securities (total)  34% 
187  Derivatives (OTC - notional 
value) 
22%  199  Asset-backed securities (impaired)  11% 
188  Derivatives (OTC - fair 
value - positive) 
37%  200  Asset-backed securities (CDOs)  22% 
189  Derivatives (OTC - fair 
value - negative) 
37%  201  Asset-backed securities (RMBSs)  21% 
190  Derivatives (hedging - 
nominal value) 
13%  202  Asset-backed securities (CMBSs)  19% | 79  
APPENDIX II. CALCULATION OF Z-SCORE 
The Z-score used in the study is the one derived in Boyd & Runkle (1993), 
which is a simple indicator of the risk of failure or the distance to default. 
To derive the measure, it is assumed that default occurs when the one-time 
losses of bank j in year t exceed its equity, or when  
0 < + jt jt E π .           ( A 1 )  
Then, assuming that the bank’s return on total assets (RoA), or
jt jt TA / π , is normally distributed around the mean j μ , and standard 
deviation j σ , the probability of failure is given as  
∫
∞ −
= − < = − <
jt D
jt jt jt jt jt jt dr r TA E TA pr E pr ) ( ) / / ( ) ( φ π π ,   (A2) 
where φ represents the standard normal distribution, r is the standardised 
return on assets and D is the default boundary that separates a healthy 
bank from an unhealthy one, described as the normalised equity ratio: 
j
j jt jt
jt
TA E
D
σ
μ − −
=
) / (
,      ( A 3 )  
Note that a greater D implies a greater probability of default and, 
therefore, a greater risk for the bank. The average and standard deviation 
calculations were obtained using available data for the years 2006-09.  
Since D admits negative values in most cases, the Z-score is set to be 
represented as a positive number, or as 
. jt jt D Z − =       ( A 4 )  
This implies that a greater Z-value implies a lower probability of default. 
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APPENDIX III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN 
SAMPLED BANKS 
Bank: Dexia   Country: Belgium 
Activities. The listed financial group Dexia SA was created in 1996 by the merger of three 
financial groups specialised in providing financial services to local governments in 
Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Insurance and retail activities, mostly concentrated in 
Belgium and Turkey, are more secondary. Due to its lower reliance on customer deposits 
and its lack of trading activity, in particular in the derivatives market, the bank is 
categorised as a wholesale bank in the cluster analysis. There is some evidence, however, 
that Dexia has been moving closer to retail banking in 2009. 
State aid. Dexia received a large package of state aid measures from the Belgian, French 
and Luxembourg governments during the crisis.45 This package, provided in November 
2008, contained a capital injection of €6 billion, a guarantee on liabilities of up to €150 
billion (reduced to €100 billion in November 2009) and a guarantee of $16.6 billion (€13 
billion) on impaired assets. In addition, the bank received emergency liquidity support 
from central banks, e.g. the Belgium Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve.46 
Restructuring. In line with the provisions stated in the Commission’s approval of state 
aid in February 2010, Dexia has to focus more on retail banking activities in its countries 
of origin by reducing public-sector lending, bond portfolio, market activities and 
disengaging from trading activities. 
 
Bank: KBC Group   Country: Belgium 
Activities.  The listed financial group KBC provides primarily banking and insurance 
services to retail customers and SMEs in Belgium and Eastern Europe.  
State aid. During the crisis, the banking group was recapitalised twice (i.e. in December 
2008 and June 2009) by the Belgium federal- and Flemish regional government for a total 
                                                      
45 Commission Decision of 26 February 2010 on State aid C 9/09 (ex NN 49/08, NN 50/08 and 
NN 45/08) implemented by the Kingdom of Belgium, the French Republic and the Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg for Dexia SA, Official Journal L274, 19 October 2010 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:274:0054:0102:EN:PDF). 
46 Dexia borrowed up to $31.5 billion (€25 billion) of the FED’s discount window. See Bloomberg, 
“Dexia Drew Most From Discount Window in Record Week in 2008”, Bradley Keoun, Bloomberg, 
31 March 2011 (http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/belgium-s-dexia-drew-most-
from-discount-window-during-record-week-in-2008.html). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 81 
amount of €7 billion. In addition, the government took over part of the risk on several 
collateralised debt obligation (CDO) portfolios of a total notional value of €20 billion.47 
Restructuring. In line with the provisions of the Commission’s approval of state aid, KBC 
has to sell or cease a significant number of businesses, particularly non-core business. 
Among the activities to be sold are interests in Belgian Centea Bank and Fidea Insurance 
with the aim of enhancing competition. 
 
Bank: BayernLB   Country: Germany 
Activities.  The second largest German Landesbank, BayernLB provides financing for 
companies located in Bavaria, the Bavarian municipalities and the Bavarian state, the 
latter of which is its majority owner. Furthermore, the bank acts as the central network 
institution for the local savings banks, which in turn hold a minority stake in the bank.  
State aid. In order to continue operating, in December 2008 BayernLB obtained aid from 
the Bavarian state in the form of a capital injection of €10 billion and a risk shield for its 
asset-backed securities of €4.8 billion. In addition to the measures taken by the Bavarian 
state, the federal Financial Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin) provided €15 billion 
guarantees. The subsidiary Hypo Group Alpe Adria (HGAA) also received €0.9 billion of 
capital injection by the Austrian government.48 This first capital injection by the Austrian 
government and BayernLB was insufficient; in December 2009 HGAA was fully acquired 
by the Austrian government.49 
Restructuring. Ahead of a decision about its restructuring plan by the European 
Commission and the reform of the Landesbank sector, BayernLB sold 25.2% of its shares 
in Landesbank SaarLB to the State of Saarland.50,51 Furthermore, BayernLB and WestLB 
have been in negotiations at the end of 2010 about the feasibility of a merger between the 
two banks.52 
                                                      
47 Commission Decision of 18 November 2009 on the State aid C 18/09 (ex N 360/09) 
implemented by Belgium for KBC, Official Journal L188, 21 July 2010 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:188:0024:0051:EN:PDF). 
48 State aid C 16/09 (ex N 254/09) and N 698/09 — BayernLB, Germany, and Hypo Group Alpe 
Adria, Austria, Official Journal C85, 31 March 2010 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:085:0021:0029:EN:PDF). 
49 BayernLB tries to recover losses of the acquisition of HGAA from two former members of the 
supervisory board who would have failed to call a decisive supervisory board meeting. See 
“BayernLB to seek damages”, Financial Times, 16 March 2011, p. 17 
(http://presscuttings.ft.com/presscuttings/s/3/viewPdf/45580040). 
50 BayernLB, “The Saarland to purchase BayernLB’s shares of SaarLB”, press release, 21 December 
2009 (http://www.bayernlb.de/internet/ln/ar/sc/Internet/en/Downloads/0100_Corporate 
Center/1323Presse_Politik/Pressemeldungen/2009/12Dec/21122009_SaarLB-e.pdf). 
51 BayernLB’s remaining 49.9% of the shares will most probably be transferred in the upcoming 
years (http://www.bayernlb.de/internet/ln/ar/sc/Internet/en/Downloads/0100_ 
CorporateCenter/1323Presse_Politik/Pressemeldungen/2009/12Dec/21122009_SaarLB-e.pdf). 
52 BayernLB, “BayernLB discontinues merger talks with WestLB”, press release, 4 November 2010, 
BayernLB (http://www.bayernlb.de/internet/ln/ar/sc/Internet/en/Downloads/ 
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Bank: Commerzbank   Country: Germany 
Activities.  Commerzbank became the second largest private credit institution in 
Germany following the acquisition of Dresdner Bank in May 2009. The listed banking 
group mainly focuses on commercial banking, serving the retail clients and small- and 
medium-sized corporations (SMEs) in Germany as well as through its affiliates in Central 
and Eastern Europe. In addition, Commerzbank explores substantial investment banking 
activities. However, it was the scale of interbank activities that qualified Commerzbank to 
be identified as a wholesale bank in the cluster analysis for the years 2006 to 2008. In 2009, 
the acquisition of Dresdner has led to a substantial jump in the bank’s trading activities 
and in particular derivative transactions, resulting in the re-categorisation of the bank as 
an investment bank in the cluster analysis.  
State aid. During the financial crisis, Commerzbank was recapitalised twice, once in 
December 2008 and again in May 2009, for a total amount of €18.2 billion and received 
guarantees on issued bearer bonds of up to €15 billion. The capital problems of 
Commerzbank were mainly derived from major losses on ABS portfolio acquired by the 
takeover of Dresdner. In April 2011, the bank announced its plans to repay the silent 
participation of €16.2 billion by issuing €11 billion new shares, of which a quarter will be 
acquired by the government. The remaining €5.2 billion will be repaid by excess 
regulatory capital by 2014 at the latest.53 
Restructuring. In line with the provisions of the Commission’s approval of state aid, 
Commerzbank is forced to sell part of its subsidiaries engaging primarily in private 
banking before the beginning of 2012.54 In addition, the bank is to divest its interests in 
the commercial real estate banking and public finance business of Eurohypo AG by 
December 2014. Meanwhile it has to shrink the public finance business portfolio by more 
than a third before the beginning of 2013.55 In addition, the bank also has to reduce its 
market presence in investment banking and in Central and Eastern Europe.56 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
0100_CorporateCenter/1323Presse_Politik/Pressemeldungen/2010/11November/04112010-
WestLB-e.pdf). 
53 Commerzbank, “Commerzbank intends to largely reduce silent participations of SoFFin”, press 
release, 6 April 2011 (https://www.commerzbank.de/en/hauptnavigation/aktionaere/service/ 
archive/ir-nachrichten_1/2011_6/ir_nachrichten_detail_11_3096.html). 
54 Commerzbank will have to sell its shareholdings in Kleinwort Benson Private Bank Limited 
and Kleinwort Benson, (Channel Islands) Holdings Limited, United Kingdom (including the 
Channel Islands); Dresdner Van Moer Courtens S.A., Belgium; Dresdner VPV NV, the 
Netherlands; Privatinvest Bank AG, Austria; Reuschel & Co. Kommanditgesellschaft, Germany; 
and Allianz Dresdner Bauspar AG, Germany. 
55 The public finance business portfolio of Commerzbank must be reduced from around €160 
billion mid-year 2009 to around €100 billion by December 2012.  
56  State  aid N 244/2009 – Commerzbank – Germany, C(2009) 3708 final,  7 May 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/231053/231053_959312_23_1.pdf). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 83 
Bank: Deutsche Bank   Country: Germany 
Activities.  The listed financial group Deutsche Bank offers a broad range of banking 
services to private and corporate clients both internationally and in Germany. In addition, 
the bank has substantial investment banking activities including e.g. M&A advisory and 
trading. The bank, for instance, was the fourth-largest global issuer of, for example, 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs) at the time the US housing bubble burst.57 
Crisis. Although Deutsche Bank reported lower profitability, the bank did not receive 
state aid during the crisis and issued €2.2 billion new shares in 2009.58 In the aftermath of 
the crisis, the bank extended its German retail network by acquiring Deutsche Postbank 
AG while further strengthening its capital position with the issuance of new shares worth 
€10.2 billion in October 2010.59 
Legal. Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the group received several claims from 
customers for providing insufficient and wrong information on the inherent risks of its 
financial products. In 2008 and 2009, the group repurchased products from private 
investors which led to additional costs of approximately €300 million for the group, of 
which about €100 million was for a settlement in the US. The US Government has, for 
instance, charged $1 billion (€0.7 billion) to Deutsche Bank and its subsidiary MortgageIT 
for misleading the US authorities to qualify for the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) insurance scheme, which guarantees mortgage loans.60 In addition, the bank is 
subject to industry-wide investigations of US, Japan and UK regulators on the 
manipulation of the LIBOR benchmark interest rate61 and the European Commission on 
the clearing and pricing information in the CDS market.62 
 
Bank: DZ Bank   Country: Germany 
Activities.  DZ Bank AG is the central network institution for most local cooperative 
banks in Germany, engaging primarily in interbank activities with its network. In 
addition, the bank functions as a corporate bank for medium- and large-sized companies 
and institutional investors. Although the bank did not receive any state aid, it increased 
                                                      
57 For more information, see Reuters, Global ABS CDO issuance 2006 and 2007, Reuters, 20 April 
2010 (http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/10/04/GLB_GCDOV0410.gif). 
58 Deutsche Bank noted a net loss in 2008 and lower profits in 2009 and 2010. The loss in 2008 was 
mainly due to a net loss of €10 billion on assets/liabilities at fair value i.e. losses in credit trading, 
equity derivative and equity proprietary trading.  
59 Deutsche Bank, “Deutsche Bank successfully completes capital increase”, press release, 6 
October 2010 (http://www.db.com/ir/en/download/IR-Release_2010_10_06.pdf). 
60 Financial Times, “Deutsche accused of lying over US mortgages”, Patrick Jenkins, 3 May 2011 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a1828f30-7592-11e0-8492-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1LIiN5zY0). 
61 Financial Times, “Big banks investigated over Libor”, Brooke Masters, Patrick Jenkins and 
Justin Baer, 15 March 2011 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab563882-4f08-11e0-9c25-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1LIiN5zY0). 
62 European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission probes Credit Default Swaps market”, 29 April 
2011 (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/509&format=HTML& 
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its capital by issuing €400 million of new shares to other cooperatives in the network at 
the end of 2009.63 
Merger. In the beginning of 2009, the DZ Bank and WGZ Bank, the central network 
institution for the rest of Germany’s cooperative banks, entered into negotiations to 
merge their networks. The talks were officially suspended because of the turmoil in the 
financial markets.64 
 
Bank: Hypo Real Estate Holding   Country: Germany 
Activities. Commercial real estate and public sector financer Hypo Real Estate Holding 
AG was established in October 2003, as a spin-off of the HVB Group. The size of the 
bank’s activities grew substantially by the takeover of Irish public sector financer DEPFA 
Bank just prior to the onset of the financial crisis in 2007. The group mainly funds its 
activities via short-term interbank debt and debt securities, e.g. mortgage and public 
sector bonds. The bank’s scale of interbank operations, including loans, is the reason that 
it was categorised as a wholesale bank in the cluster analysis.  
State aid. Hypo Real Estate encountered its first immediate financial problems in October 
2008, when it was not able to raise sufficient short-term funding to continue its 
operations. Since then, the bank benefited from approximately €7.9 billion of capital 
injections, up to €145 billion of state guarantees and undisclosed amounts of liquidity by 
central banks. Since October 2009, the bank is fully owned by the German federal 
government. In September 2010 a ‘bad bank’ was formed, which received up to €200 
billion of toxic and non-strategic assets to make Deutsche Pfandbriefbank, the ‘good 
bank’, more viable. 
Restructuring. Following the proposed restructuring plan made to the European 
Commission under state aid procedures, Hypo Real Estate had to restructure its business, 
reducing the size of its activities in real estate and public sector finance, shrinking assets 
by almost 75% to €110-120 billion at the end of 2010. This should reduce the dependency 
of short-term financing of the bank. Despite the thorough restructuring, the European 
Commission still has doubts about the viability of Hypo Real Estate. Therefore the 
European Commission only gave temporal approval to the state aid and extended the 
scope of the proceedings in September 2010.65 
 
 
 
                                                      
63 DZ Bank, “DZ BANK successfully completes capital increase”, press release, 2 November 2009 
(http://www.dzbank.com/components/getirdl.php?id=193).  
64 DZ Bank, “DZ BANK and WGZ BANK decide not to pursue their merger talks further for the 
time being”, press release, 1 April 2009 
(http://www.dzbank.com/components/getirdl.php?id=127). 
65 State aid C 15/09 (ex N 196/09) and N 380/10 — Extension of scope of formal investigation 
procedure, winding-up institution, additional SoFFin guarantees for HRE: Hypo Real Estate, 
Official Journal, 2010/C 300/06, 6 November 2010 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:300:0006:0016:EN:PDF). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 85 
Bank: Landesbank Baden-Württemberg   Country: Germany 
Activities.  Landesbank Baden-Württemberg (LBBW) primarily functions as a central 
network institution for the savings banks in Baden-Württemberg, Saxony (since 2008) and 
Rhineland Palatinate (since 2005). As more secondary functions, the bank engages in real 
estate financing as well as providing retail activities to SMEs and larger corporations. 
Despite an increasing share of trading activities in 2008 and 2009, the bank is nevertheless 
categorised as a wholesale bank in the cluster analysis due to the scale of its interbank 
activities. 
State aid. LBBW received in June 2009 a capital injection of €5 billion by its shareholders, 
including all public entities and governments, after facing large losses and higher capital 
requirements.66 In addition, German states took two impaired asset relief measures, 
totalling €12.7 billion of guarantees on structured securities. The majority of the 
guarantees (€8.8 billion) were backing the portfolio acquired from the SachsenLB, part of 
the 2008 take-over deal.67,68 
Restructuring. In line with the agreement struck with the European Commission under 
state aid procedures, LBBW will have to restructure its business model to align it more 
closely with a more retail services focus, diminishing its capital markets and proprietary 
trading activities.  
 
Bank: WestLB   Country: Germany 
Activities. Westdeutsche Landesbank (WestLB) is a central network institution for the 
saving banks of German State North Rhine-Westphalia. Despite its main function, 
WestLB carries out commercial and investment banking operations. The bank’s 
increasing engagement in trading activities, especially in derivative transactions, is the 
main driving force behind its categorisation as an investment bank and not a wholesale 
bank in the cluster analysis.  
State aid. During the crisis, the bank’s exposures to structured finance products and its 
reliance on short-term funding were its main weaknesses. In mid-2007, the bank was 
unable to rollover the funding for its structured finance assets. In order to solve the 
problem, the bank’s portfolio of toxic assets, representing a nominal value of €85.1 billion, 
was ring-fenced in a so-called ‘bad bank’. In 2009, WestLB also received a capital injection 
of €7 billion from the German government.69 
                                                      
66 All shareholders contributed to the capital injection in proportion to their shareholdings: 
Baden-Württemberg state (35.5%), Stuttgart (19%), savings banks associations of Baden- 
Württemberg (41%) and the Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg (almost 5%).  
67 Commission Decision of 15 December 2009 on State aid C 17/09 (ex N 265/09) by Germany for 
the restructuring of Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, Official Journal L 188, 21 July 2010 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:188:0001:0023:EN:PDF). 
68 SachsenLB, “Takeover of Sachsen LB complete”, press release, 7 March 2008 
(http://www.lbbw.de/lbbwde/1000011757-s1048-en.html). 
69 STATE AID — GERMANY State aid C 40/09 (ex N 555/09) Extension of formal investigation 
procedure, WestLB AG Invitation to submit comments pursuant to Article 108(2) TFEU, Official 
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Restructuring. In May 2009, the bank faced a restructuring plan in order to stop 
proprietary trading, halving its total assets and bringing its core areas of business into 
focus. But in February 2010, the European Commission required additional restructuring 
measures after it found that the amount of the initial capital injection support was 
understated by €3.4 billion. The measures proposed by the bank in February 2011 contain 
a splitting-up of the bank into four parts and shrinking the assets by an extra third.70 
Meanwhile WestLB remains in discussion with BayernLB for an eventual merger.71 
 
Bank: Danske Bank   Country: Denmark 
Activities.  Danske Bank Group provides retail banking services in Scandinavia, the 
Baltics and (Northern) Ireland. In recent years, the listed bank has expanded into pension, 
life-insurance, asset management and substantial capital markets activities. However, the 
bank is categorised as a wholesale bank due to the scale of its interbank activities, 
especially interbank loans that represent nearly 40% of the balance sheet.  
Growth. The financial crisis ended a decade-long series of major acquisitions for the 
bank, which started in 1997 with the acquisition of Enskilda in Sweden (1997) and 
continued with the acquisition of Focus Bank in Norway (1999), National Irish Bank in 
Ireland and Northern Bank in Northern Ireland (2005), and, most recently, Sampo Bank in 
Finland (2007).72 
State aid. The economic slowdown and falling property prices in Denmark and Ireland 
led to higher impairment charges and lower profits in the period 2007 to 2009. In 
consequence, the bank had to seek a capital injection of 26 billion Danish krona 
(approximately €3.5 billion) from the Danish government in May 2009, which was 
provided as hybrid capital.73 The state aid was repaid in March 2011 by the issuance of 20 
billion Danish krona (approximately €2.7 billion) worth of new shares.74 Danske also 
                                                                                                                                       
Journal, 2011/C 23/07, 25 January  (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2011:023:0009:0032:EN:PDF). 
70 WestLB, “Restructuring Plan Submitted to the European Commission within the Agreed 
Timeframe”, press release, 16 February 2011 (http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/ 
westlb_de/en/wlb/ui/news/newscontainer/news_2011/meldung.standard.gid-
N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html).  
71 WestLB, “WestLB Regrets Premature Break-Off of Merger Talks by BayernLB”, press release, 4 
November 2010 (http://www.westlb.de/cms/sitecontent/westlb/westlb_de/en/wlb/ui/news/ 
newscontainer/news_2010/eigen.standard.gid-
N2FkNDZmMzU4OWFmYTIyMWM3N2Q2N2Q0YmU1NmI0OGU_.html).  
72 Danske Bank Group, “The Group”, 2011 (http://www.danskebank.com/en-uk/about-
us/History/Pages/Group.aspx). 
73 Danmarks Nationalbank, Financial stability report 2010, 2010. 
74 Danske Bank Group, “Danske Bank sets terms for rights offering and publishes prospectus”, 
press release, 14 March 2011 (http://www.danskebank.com/en-uk/press/News/Press-releases-
and-company-announcements/Company%20announcement/Group/Pages/ca14032011.aspx). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 87 
reduced its activities in Ireland and changed the organisational structure by appointing a 
special risk officer on the executive committee.75,76 
 
Bank: Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   Country: Spain 
Activities.  The listed financial group Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria S.A. (BBVA) 
provides financial services to households, SMEs, large corporations, governments and 
local authorities in Spain, Portugal, Latin America and the United States. In addition to its 
primary retail activities, BBVA also operates asset management, capital markets and 
insurance arms. 
Crisis. The impact of the financial crisis on BBVA has been relatively limited, absorbed 
mainly through lower profits. Nevertheless, the bank issued preference shares, 
mandatory convertible bonds and subordinated debt and sold tangible assets to raise its 
capital level and expand activities.77 
Expansion. After a period of no acquisitions during the crisis, BBVA raised its equity 
stake in Chinese Citic Bank to 15% in 2009, and acquired Guaranty Bank assets and 
liabilities from FDIC in the US and public financer Banco de Crédito Local de España in 
Spain. In 2010, BBVA acquired almost 25% of Garanti Bank in Turkey for €4.2 billion.78 
 
Bank: Banco Santander   Country: Spain 
Activities. The Spanish financial group Banco Santander is primarily engaged in retail 
and commercial banking. In addition, Santander undertakes asset management, 
wholesale banking and insurance activities. Besides in Spain, the listed bank has 
significant presence within the EU (including affiliates in Germany, Italy, Portugal and 
UK), Latin America (Brazil, Chile and Mexico), and the United States.79 Due to a low 
proportion of trading and interbank activities, which are the main characteristics of 
                                                      
75 National Irish Bank, “National Irish Bank restructures, confirms commitment to Ireland”, press 
release, 7 December 2009 (http://www.nationalirishbank.ie/en-ie/About-National-Irish-
Bank/Press/Press-releases/2009/Pages/PressReleaseChangesToYourBank.aspx). 
76 Danske Bank Group, “Danske Bank adjusts organisation and appoints Chief Risk Officer”, 
press release, 16 December 2009 (http://www.danskebank.com/en-uk/press/News/Press-
releases-and-company-announcements/Company%20announcement/Group/Pages/ 
ca16122009.aspx. 
77 In 2009 BBVA sold 948 properties, mostly offices in Spain, to Tree Inversiones Inmobiliarias 
under a long term sale and lease-back agreement. The bank made a gross capital gain of €0.8 
billion. Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, “BBVA obtains €1,154 million from the sale of 948 
properties”, press release, 25 September 2009 (http://press.bbva.com/latest-contents/press-
releases/spain/bbva-obtains-1-154-million-from-the-sale-of-948-properties(9882-22-101-c-
44492).html). 
78 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, “BBVA to acquire a 24.9% stake in Garanti, Turkey’s leading 
bank”, press release, 2 November 2010 (http://press.bbva.com/bbva-to-acquire-a-24-9-stake-in-
garanti-turkeys-leading-bank.html). 
79 Banco Santander S.A., “Banco Santander Annual Report 2009”, 2010. 88 | APPENDIX III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SAMPLED BANKS 
investment and wholesale banks, respectively, the bank is categorised as a retail bank in 
the cluster analysis. 
Crisis. Santander has not received any direct state aid during the financial crisis, 
continuing to improve its market position in retail and commercial banking activities in 
Europe, with autonomous growth and acquisition of troubled banks. The recent 
acquisitions include the UK branch networks of Bradford & Bingley and part of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland in 2008 and 201080; retail banking business of Swedish SEB in 
Germany;81 and around 70% of Bank Zachodni’s retail banking network WBK in 
Poland.82  
Expansion. Just before the crisis erupted, Santander bought parts of ABN Amro, of which 
it kept the Latin American business (Banco Real) and resold the Italian Antonveneta 
bank.83 Although Santander’s acquisitions are usually financed by own equity and 
retained earnings, for the takeover of ABN Amro the bank issued €7 billion of mandatory 
convertible bonds and sold tangible assets and divested some of the non-core 
investments.  
 
Bank: BNP Paribas   Country: France 
Activities. The French listed financial group BNP Paribas is present in several key EU 
markets. In addition to France and Italy, since the acquisition of Fortis Bank and BGL in 
2009, the bank has a substantial presence in Belgium and Luxembourg. Besides its retail, 
corporate lending and real estate financing activities, the bank’s primary activity lies in 
trading, especially in the capital markets, and derivative transactions.  
Crisis. The group was one of the first banks to show signs of the eruption of a financial 
crisis when it froze three investment funds in August 2007.84 Despite greater provisions 
due to increased risks, BNP Paribas managed to remain profitable during the financial 
                                                      
80 Banco Santander S.A., “Santander agrees to acquire 318 RBS branches for EUR 1.99 billion”, 
press release, 4 August 2010 (http://www.santander.com/csgs/BlobServer?blobtable= 
MungoBlobs&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobwhere=1265281592309&blobcol=urldata&blo
bkey=id&leng=en_GB).  
81 Banco Santander S.A., “Santander to acquire SEB's German retail banking business for EUR 555 
million”, press release, 12 July 2010 (http://www.santander.com/csgs/BlobServer? 
blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobwhere=1265280146183&blobcol=ur
ldata&blobkey=id&leng=en_GB).  
82 Banco Santander, “Santander to acquire 70% of Bank Zachodni WBK of Poland from AIB for 
EUR 2.938 billion”, press release, 10 September 2010 (http://www.santander.com/csgs/ 
BlobServer?blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobwhere=1265283104170
&blobcol=urldata&blobkey=id&leng=en_GB). 
83 Banco Santander sold Antonveneta Bank for €2.4 billion more to Monte dei Paschi di Siena.  
84 Financial Times, “BNP Paribas investment funds hit by volatility”, Anuj Gangahar and Adam 
Jones, 9 August 2007 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9a4cabc4-464d-11dc-a3be-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1LIiN5zY0.  BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 89 
turmoil. Like the other major French banks, the bank received capital injections provided 
by the French government.85 All of the €5.1 billion of government aid received in 
exchange for non-voting shares in March 2009 (and under the condition of increased 
l e n d i n g )  w e r e  r e p a i d  b y  O c t o b e r  o f  t h e  s a m e  y e a r ,  f i n a n c e d  b y  t h e  i s s u a n c e  o f  n e w  
common shares. 
 
Bank: BPCE   Country: France 
Activities.  The BPCE group was created during the crisis in 2009 by the merger of 
Groupe Banque Populaire and Groupe Caisse d’Epargne. Prior to the merger, both banks 
served, among other functions, as central network institutions for their local cooperative 
and savings banks. The newly created group also suffered large losses from its 
investment arm, Natixis, and has received capital injections from the French 
government.86,87 
Crisis. The merger of the bank between Natixis’s owners Banque Populaire and Caisse 
d’Epargne was one of the conditions of the French government for providing additional 
state aid. In the first instance the banks injected own funds, partially obtained by state 
aid, in its investment bank Natixis, but this appeared to be insufficient. To obtain the 
necessary additional funds from the French government, the parent banks were forced to 
increase their grip on the investment bank by the merger.88 However, Banque Populaire 
and Caisse d’Epargne also suffered  from the crisis by higher risk costs and trading losses, 
e.g. Caisse Nationale des Caisses d’Epargne had one equity derivative position on which 
it lost €752 million. 
State aid. In total BPCE received in two tranches a capital injection of €7.1 billion89 from 
the French state (€2 billion in December 2008 and €5.1 billion in the first half of 2009). In 
exchange for €5.1 billion support, the French state received preference shares 
representing a share of 20%of the group. For the other €2 billion, the state received 
subordinated debt securities.90 BPCE repaid €4.1 billion of the aid received from the 
French government. 
                                                      
85 State aid N 29/2009 – French Republic Amendment to the capital-injection scheme for banks, 
C(2008) 597 final, 28 January 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/229327/ 
229327_1015954_16_1.pdf). 
86 Between 2007 and 2009, Natixis reported a total negative net income of €5.6 billion. 
87 The investment bank Natixis was formed in 2006 by the merger of Banque Populaire’s 
subsidiary Natexis and Caisse d’Epargne’s subsidiary IXIS. Both banking groups held an equity 
stake of 35% in Natixis. The investment bank in its turn owns 20% of the regional Banque 
Populaires and Caisses d’Epargne banks.  
88 Financial Times, “Merger shakes up French mutuals”, 13 July 2009 (http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/f30f33e4-6fdb-11de-b835-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1HGPQQwLM). 
89 Due to the merger, BPCE had an additional capital requirement of €5 billion, because of 
accounting and prudential rules; e.g. Natixis was only proportionally consolidated for 
approximately 70% in the parent’s figures whereas it is fully consolidated after the merger. 
90 State Aid N 249/2009 – French Republic Injection of capital into the institution to be created by 
the merger of the parent companies of the Caisse d'Épargne and Banque Populaire groups, 
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Bank: Crédit Agricole   Country: France 
Activities.  In addition to its retail activities in France, the Crédit Agricole group has 
substantial asset management, specialised finance (i.e. consumer finance, lease finance 
and factoring), corporate and investment banking and insurance activities. The listed 
group also owns subsidiaries in other EU member states (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal), the Middle East and Northern Africa. Despite these international and 
investment activities, due to the scale of its interbank activities, especially interbank loans 
representing over one-fifth of its total activities, the group is categorised as a wholesale 
bank in the cluster analysis.  
State aid. The bank managed to remain profitable during the crisis and was able to offset 
its losses by rationalising costs, reducing capital market activities and halting 
acquisitions.91 In July 2008, the group increased its capital by issuing €5.8 billion of new 
shares. In addition, and like the other major French banks, Crédit Agricole received a 
capital injection of €3 billion of capital contributing to Tier 1 in exchange for super-
subordinated notes in December 2008.92 The super-subordinated notes were repaid in full 
in October 2009 by issuing deeply subordinated debt on the financial markets. The French 
government also provided guarantees of up to €18.6 billion of collateralised loans used to 
issue additional debt to be used primarily for liquidity purposes.  
Expansion. Crédit Agricole continued with its takeover activity in 2009 and onwards, 
with the acquisition of 23.4% (€1.1 billion) stakes in the Spanish Bankinter, an additional 
35% (€0.6 billion) of French asset servicing provider CACEIS in 2009, and a 79.9% stake in 
the Italian Cassa di Risparmio della Spezi in 2011.93 
 
Bank: Société Générale   Country: France 
Activities.  The listed financial group Société Générale undertakes primarily retail, 
corporate and investment banking activities. The group’s retail network is present in 
France, Eastern Europe and Northern Africa. The corporate and investment bank 
activities are also spread around the globe, containing mainly trading activities and 
financial advisory services. Although its retail activities are sizeable, the bank primarily 
engages in trading activities, especially derivative transactions, which is the reason that 
the bank is categorised as an investment bank in the cluster analysis. 
                                                                                                                                       
C(2009) 3835 final,  8 May 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/231081/ 
231081_1014474_46_1.pdf). 
91 The financial crisis had a serious impact on the bank’s investment arm and the Greek retail 
bank Emporiki. 
92 State aid N 29/2009 – French Republic Amendment to the capital-injection scheme for banks, 
C(2008) 597 final, 28 January 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/229327/ 
229327_1015954_16_1.pdf). 
93 Crédit Agricole S.A., “Another major step forward in Crédit Agricole's expansion in Italy”, 
press release, 11 January 2011 (http://www.credit-agricole.com/en/News/Press-releases/ 
Financial-press-releases/Another-major-step-forward-in-Credit-Agricole-s-expansion-in-Italy). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 91 
Crisis. Société Générale reported lower but nevertheless positive net income figures 
during the financial turmoil.94 The main losses have been related to financial instruments 
linked to US residential real estate. In addition in January 2008, the bank lost €4.9 billion 
due to the fraudulent activities of one of its traders, Jérôme Kerviel.95 This loss was 
compensated by the issuance of €5.5 billion of new shares in February 2008.  
State aid. Like the other major French banks, the group received a capital injection of €1.7 
billion in exchange for preference shares.96 The preference shares were repaid in 
November 2009 by issuing €4.8 billion new shares. Part of this amount was used to 
acquire the last 20% (€0.7 billion) of Crédit du Nord from Belgium’s troubled bank 
Dexia.97 
 
Bank: Intesa Sanpaolo Group   Country: Italy 
Activities. Although the business and retail activities of the Intesa Sanpaolo Group are 
focused mainly in Italy, the bank also has a substantial presence in Central and Eastern 
Europe and Egypt. Retail clients and SMEs are the main source of income for the listed 
financial group. The Group was created in January 2007 through the merger of Banca 
Intesa and Sanpaolo IMI. In the last few years, Intesa Sanpaolo engaged in smaller 
takeovers to strengthen its core business, buying some of the branches of the Banca 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena in December 2009 and buying a majority stake in the Banca 
Monte Parma in October 2010. 
Crisis. The Intesa Sanpaolo Group was hit relatively hard by the financial turmoil, which 
resulted in significant lower commission and trading income and higher impairments on 
equity and intangibles in 2008 and 2009. To increase its capital level and lending capacity, 
Intesa Sanpaolo issued hybrid capital instruments and sold non-core assets. In December 
2009, the securities service business was sold for €1.8 billion to State Street Corporation. 
98,99 In March 2009, Intesa Sanpaolo announced it would start procedures to receive a 
                                                      
94 The net income of Société Générale dropped in 2007 and stayed at a lower level for three 
consecutive years 2007-10. 
95 Financial Times, “Kerviel found guilty in SocGen scandal”, Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Financial 
Times, 5 October 2010 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bd166528-d05b-11df-afe1-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1HKuk3rbB). 
96 State aid N 29/2009 – French Republic Amendment to the capital-injection scheme for banks, 
C(2008) 597 final, 28 January 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/229327/ 
229327_1015954_16_1.pdf). 
97 Société Générale, “Société Générale and Dexia complete the Crédit du Nord transaction“, press 
release, 11 December 2009 (http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item= 
UGFyZW50SUQ9MjM0OTh8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1). 
98 In 2008 and 2009, Intesa Sanpaolo issued €2.5 billion preference and innovative equity 
instruments, which contribute to Tier 1 capital (Intesa Sanpaolo Group Annual Reports 2009).  
99 Intesa Sanpaolo, “Intesa Sanpaolo signs agreement for sale of securities services business to 
State Street Corporation”, press release, 22 December 2009 
(http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/si09/contentData/view/content-
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capital injection of up to €4 billion from the Italian Government, but decided in 
September not to opt for the plan due to its costs.100 Under pressure from the regulator 
and supervisor, Intesa Sanpaolo announced in April 2011 that it would strengthen its 
capital by issuing €5 billion of new shares at the end of the year.101 
 
Bank: UniCredit Group   Country: Italy 
Activities. The listed financial group UniCredit Group is primarily engaged in retail and 
corporate banking in Italy, Germany, Austria and Central and Eastern Europe. In 
addition, the financial group also offers insurance products and has capital market 
activities, which mainly support the other activities. The group grew substantially in the 
second half of the 2000s due to its acquisitions, including HVB Group in Germany (2006), 
Bank Austria Creditanstalt in Austria (2006) and Capitalia Group in Italy (2007). 
Crisis. UniCredit reported lower profits during the financial turmoil due to higher risk 
costs, lower trading income and write downs on investments.102 UniCredit did not 
receive any state aid during the crisis, but had to raise capital by issuing share and hybrid 
instruments as well as retaining earnings.103 In 2009, the bank announced that it was 
considering applying for government support, which would be costly for shareholders,104 
but finally (in January 2010) issued approximately €4 billion of new ordinary shares105 to 
increase its capital level.  
Capital requirements. Unlike other Italian commercial banks, UniCredit was granted 
extra time to raise its capital ratios to the capital requirements levels of Basel III. The 
deadline for the bank was postponed to end-2011 in April 2011, mainly because of its 
                                                      
100 Intesa Sanpaolo, “Intesa has second thoughts over €4bn aid”, Patrick Jenkins and Vincent 
Boland, Financial Times, 3 September 2009 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/761c0790-98ad-11de-
aa1b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1LIiN5zY0).  
101 Intesa Sanpaolo, “Intesa Sanpaolo: Capital Increase”, press release, 6 April 2011 
(http://www.group.intesasanpaolo.com/scriptIsir0/si09/contentData/view/content-
ref?id=CNT-04-00000000464EA). 
102 UniCredit purchased in 2007 Kazakh ATF bank for about €1.7 billion and had to write down in 
2008 and 2010 about €0.8 billion on goodwill. In addition, the bank has stated impairments of €0.3 
billion in 2008 on the acquisition of USB in Ukraine for about €1.6 billion a year earlier. (Sources: 
UniCredit Group (2007), “UniCredit: Bank Austria signs agreement to acquire majority 
shareholding in AFT Bank in the Republic of Kazakhstan”, press release, 21 June; UniCredit 
Group (2007), “UniCredit: Bank Austria signs agreement to acquire majority shareholding in 
Ukrsotsbank in Ukraine”, press release, 5 July; and UniCredit Annual Reports 2008 & 2010.) 
103 At the end of 2009, the Tier 1 capital of €39 billion included €5 billion of (non)-innovative 
capital instruments; €3 billion of this hybrid capital was raised in 2008 and 2009.  
104 Bloomberg, “UniCredit Plans EU4 Billion-Euro Stock Sale, Rejects State Aid”, Sonia Sirletti, 
Bloomberg, 29 September 2009 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6uTR1DMel70). 
105 UniCredit Group, “The Board of Directors determines the conditions of the capital increase, 
subject to obtaining the regulatory approvals required by applicable laws”, press release, 7 
January 2010 (http://www.unicreditgroup.eu/en/pressreleases/PressRelease1379.htm). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 93 
fragile shareholder base, i.e. three major shareholders lack funds to participate in a rights 
issue.106 
 
Bank: ABN Amro Holding   Country: The Netherlands 
Takeover. ABN Amro is currently a state-owned bank, following the merger between 
Fortis Bank Nederland and the Dutch and International Private Banking of the former 
ABN Amro. In October 2007, ABN Amro was acquired for €72 billion by a hostile 
takeover of a consortium consisting of RBS, Fortis and Santander.107 These three financial 
groups divided up the bank’s activities. RBS acquired the wholesale activities; Fortis 
obtained the asset management and Dutch activities; and Santander bought the Italian 
and Brazilian activities.108 In the fall of 2008, Santander’s parts were de-merged while the 
Dutch state acquired the Fortis bank’s parts. The break-up of the activities of the group 
was completed in February 2010 when the former RBS and Fortis parts were split.109 In 
July 2010, the former Fortis part in ABN Amro and the banking activities of Fortis in the 
Netherlands were merged to form the new ABN Amro bank.110  
Activities. The new bank focuses mainly on providing basic banking services to retail 
customers and SMEs in the Netherlands as well as private banking services to its 
international clients. Between the years 2006 and 2009, the bank’s categorisation changed 
several times according to the results of the cluster analysis. Formerly assigned to the 
retail bank category, ABN Amro was re-categorised as an investment bank in 2008, owing 
to the break-up of the retail activities from the main group. The clustering assignment 
changed once again in 2009, when the bank was categorised as a wholesale bank due to 
the de-merger of the activities and sale of some of the retail activities.  
State aid. Owing partly to its failed merger in 2007-08, ABN Amro has received 
substantial support from the Dutch government to increase capital and eliminate 
liquidity shortages. After the rescue and the subsequent break-up of Fortis by the 
governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, the Dutch government 
bought the parts sold to Fortis (for €12.8 billion) and Fortis’s Dutch insurance activities 
(€4 billion). In addition, the Dutch authorities provided liquidity facilities of €34 billion to 
                                                      
106 Financial Times, “UniCredit given extra time on capital ratios”, Patrick Jenkins, Financial 
Times, 20 April 2011 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d2c3334-6aa9-11e0-80a1-
00144feab49a,s01=1.html#axzz1JxU9WLTW). 
107 Financial Times, “Spanish in position”, Victor Mallet, Financial Times, 20 October 2009 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/53bc70a6-bda9-11de-9f6a-00144feab49a.html#axzz1HKuk3rbB).  
108 In an earlier stage of the takeover battle in 2007, ABN Amro already sold its US subsidiary 
LaSalle for $21 billion (€16 billion) to Bank of America. For more, see Financial Times, “$21bn sale 
of ABN's US arm finalised”, Sarah Laitner, 2 October 2007 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/db658146-7080-11dc-a6d1-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1HKuk3rbB).  
109 ABN Amro, “ABN AMRO completes legal demerger”, press release, 8 February 2010 
(http://www.abnamro.com/en/press-room/press-release-archive/2010/ABN-AMRO-
completes-legal-demerger.html).  
110 ABN Amro, “Completion of ABN AMRO Bank and Fortis Bank Nederland legal merger”, 
press release, 30 June 2010 (http://www.abnamro.com/en/press-room/press-release-
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repay the short-term debts and €16 billion to repay the long-term debts of the new ABN 
Amro.111 The funding obtained from the short-term debt facility was fully repaid in July 
2009, following the issuance of €14.5 billion worth of government-backed bonds.112  113 
Furthermore, in July 2009 and January 2010, the government supported two 
recapitalisation plans of €2.5 billion (€1.7 billion via a capital relief instrument) and €4.4 
billion to enable the breakup of the bank and to compensate a shortfall in capital due to 
the forced sale of New HBU.114 
 
Bank: ING Group   Country: The Netherlands 
Activities.  The financial group ING is among the largest insurers in the world and 
maintains a substantial retail banking network in the Netherlands, Belgium and other 
European countries.115 ING’s insurance activities are focused in the United States, but the 
company also has significant market presence in Europe and Asia. In addition, the bank 
is engaged in corporate banking, asset management and capital markets activities. 
However, the scale of these activities is relatively small when compared to other banks 
that are categorised as investment banks by the cluster analysis.  
State aid. The ING Group was hit relatively hard by the financial turmoil, which resulted 
in losses on investments and higher impairments in 2008 and 2009. 116 In addition, the 
capital also decreased due to repurchasing of about €4.9 billion own shares between June 
2007 and May 2008.117 In November 2008, ING Group received aid from the Dutch 
                                                      
111 State aid NN 42/2008 - Belgium, NN 46/2008 – Luxembourg, NN 53/A/2008 – Netherlands 
Restructuring aid to Fortis Bank and Fortis Bank Luxembourg, C(2008) 8085, 3 December 2008 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/227768/227768_1027866_42_1.pdf). 
112 The €34 billion to repay short-term debt to Fortis was repaid to the Dutch State by July 2009. 
The long-term debt facility was reduced by €6.5 billion through the sale of Fortis’s stake in ABN 
Amro to the Dutch State. For more, see Dutch Ministry of Finance, “Fortis Bank Netherlands 
redeems €34 billion to the Dutch State”, press release, 2 July 2009 (http://english.minfin.nl/ 
News/Newsreleases/2009/07/Fortis_Bank_Netherlands_redeems_%E2%82%AC_34_billion_to_t
he_Dutch_State).  
113 Dutch State Treasury, “Assigned Guarantees”, overview, 1 December 2010 
(http://www.dsta.nl/dsresource?objectid=5693&type=org). 
114 Extension of procedure in State aid case C11/2009 (Alleged aid to Fortis Bank Nederland and 
ABN Amro) to cover the additional recapitalisation measures in favour of Fortis Bank Nederland 
and ABN Amro and temporary approval until 31 July 2010 (NN 2/2010 (ex N 429/2009) and N 
19/2010), the Netherlands, C(2010)726 final, 5 February 2010 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/230806/230806_1084698_239_1.pdf).  
115 The bank also maintains internet and telephone-oriented direct retail banking activities in 
several countries around the world, including Germany and the United States. 
116 ING Bank lost in 2008 and 2009 in total about €3.5 billion on its Alt-A Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities portfolio (RMBS) in the US. An additional loss of €7.5 billion on the portfolio 
was classified in 2008 as negative revaluation reserve, i.e. considered as a temporal loss provision. 
Due to the acquisition of 80% of the Alt-A portfolio by the Dutch government in 2009, the 
temporal loss provision could be reclassified as equity. 
117 ING Group, “ING completes share buyback programme”, press release, 23 May 2008 
(http://www.ing.com/group/showdoc.jsp?docid=323163_EN). BUSINESS MODELS IN EUROPEAN BANKING | 95 
government to halt the immediate capital shortage. Initially, the group received a capital 
injection of €10 billion in non-voting equity securities and the state guaranteed bonds of 
$9 billion (€6 to 7 billion) and €5 billion. Subsequently, in January 2009, the state acquired 
80% on the Alt-A and Prime RMBS portfolio in the United States for 90% of the par value 
which increased ING’s capital ratios.118,119 In December 2009, the group started repaying 
the capital injection of the state. In first instance the ING repaid half of the capital 
injection by issuing €7.5 billion in new shares.120 In May 2011, the group repaid an 
additional €2 billion of the capital injection. One month later, the group announced they 
would repay the remaining €3 billion before May 2012.121 
Restructuring. The restructuring plan approved by the European Commission has the 
aim to decrease the complexity and costs of the organisation as well as the riskiness of 
ING’s activities in the period till 2014. Since then the complexity of the group has mainly 
been reduced by separating the banking and insurance activities. A large part of the 
insurance activities must be divested and the banking activities will reduce their risk 
profile by focusing more on traditional retail banking and generating more own assets, 
instead of buying securities. The bank also had to carve out a new retail bank with a 
substantial presence on the Dutch market to increase competition in the concentrated 
domestic banking market. 122 Under the restructuring plan, ING Group announced in 
June 2011 it would sell its subsidiary ING Direct USA for $9 billion (€6.3 billion) to 
Capital One.123 
 
Bank: Rabobank Group   Country: The Netherlands 
Activities.  Rabobank Group is a fully integrated cooperative banking group focused 
primarily on retail banking activities in the Netherlands. The group is also engaged in 
                                                      
118  State Aid C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009) - illiquid assets back-up facility for ING, The 
Netherlands, C(2009) 2585 final corr., 31 March 2009 
(http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/230724/230724_958423_46_1.pdf).  
119 The total par value of the Alt-A and Prime RMBS was €30 billion, much higher than the fair 
value of €18.4 billion (December 2008). 
120 The European Commission requested the Dutch state to increase the guarantee fee paid and 
the management fee received by ING. The fees were adjusted in October 2009, i.e. the guarantee 
fee paid by ING was increased from 55BP to 137 BP per annum and the management fee charged 
by ING was decreased from 25 to 10 BP per annum. In total the bank used €1.3 billion of the 
issuance to cover an increase of the guarantee premium on the RMBS portfolio sold to the state.  
121 I N G  G r o u p ,  “ B a c k g r o u n d  t o  t h e  s a l e  o f  I N G  D I R E C T  U S A ” ,  p r e s s  r e l e a s e ,  1 7  J u n e  2 0 1 1  
(http://www.ing.com/Our-Company/Press-room/Press-release-archive/Background-to-the-
sale-of-ING-DIRECT-USA.htm).  
122  State Aid C 10/2009 (ex N 138/2009)-implemented by the Netherlands for ING's Illiquid 
Assets Back-Up Facility and Restructuring Plan, C(2009) 2585 final corr., 31 March 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/230724/230724_1071446_207_1.pdf.  
123 It is worth noting that almost one-third of the takeover bid ($2.8 billion or €1.7 billion) is paid 
in Capital One shares and the remaining RMBS portfolio is excluded from the deal. 96 | APPENDIX III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SAMPLED BANKS 
wholesale, asset management (Robeco) and insurance activities, owning part of the Dutch 
insurer Eureko.124 The group’s less prominent international activities serve mainly the 
agricultural sector and retail customers in Australia, New Zealand, United States, Brazil 
and Poland. 
Crisis. Rabobank had to increase its provisions for bad debt amidst the crisis due to its 
real estate exposures in the Netherlands and Ireland.125 Nevertheless, the financial results 
remained sound for the most part. Between 2007 and 2009, the bank strengthened its 
capital by issuing about €3.5 billion equity securities to members and institutions.126 The 
bank was one of the first European banks to experiment with alternative forms of capital, 
issuing in March 2010 €1.3 billion Senior Contingent Notes (CoCos).127  
Expansion. In the past several years Rabobank engaged in several international 
acquisitions. First, the group increased its existing stakes in the Polish BGZ bank in 2008 
and acquired part of the assets and liabilities of two local US banks from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in 2010.128  
 
Bank: Nordea Bank AB   Country: Sweden 
Activities. The activities of the Swedish financial group Nordea is present in the entire 
Scandinavian region, comprising Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In addition to 
its primary focus on retail markets, the bank also engages in corporate and investment 
banking activities as well as life insurance and pension products as secondary activities. 
The bank is partly state-owned, although the government’s ownership stake has been 
declining.129 
                                                      
124 In the light of the new more stringent capital regulations the bank reduced its stake in 
insurance company Eureko from 39 to 29%. For m o r e  d e t a i l s  o n  R a b o b a n k ’ s  e n g a g e m e n t  i n  
Eureko, see the press release (http://www.rabobank.com/content/news/news_archive/086-
RabobankandEurekoAchmeafocusoncommercialalliance.jsp).  
125 Rabobank is one of the largest actors in the Dutch real estate financing market. The bank 
increased its market presence in 2006 with the acquisition of a large part of Bouwfonds, a large 
property developer, from ABN Amro. Irish ACCBank, acquired by Rabobank in 2002, was 
heavily hit by the crisis in the Irish real estate market. In response to these developments, the Irish 
bank shrunk its customer loans by almost one-third, triggering support from Rabobank.  
126 Net increase of member certificates, capital securities and trust preferred securities between 
2007 and 2009. 
127 The contingent convertible bonds issued by Rabobank will pay out only 25%, instead of 100%, 
of their par value when Rabobank’s equity level falls below 7%. For more, see Financial Times, 
“Rabobank tests investor appetite”, Jennifer Hughes, 13 March 2010 
(http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/0/5af435f6-2e0c-11df-b85c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1HS5YETt6).  
128 Rabobank Group, “Rabobank acquires deposits, certain assets and liabilities of Butte 
Community Bank and Pacific State Bank”, press release, 20 August 2010 
(http://www.rabobank.com/content/news/news_archive/013-Rabobankacquiresdeposits 
certainassetsandliabilitiesofButteCommunityBankandPacificStateBank.jsp).  
129 In February 2011, the Swedish government reduced its equity stake in Nordea from 19.8 to 
13.5%. The government stake stems from the creation of Nordea during the Swedish financial 
crisis of the early 1990s. The Swedish government has announced to further reduce the share in 
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Crisis. The impact of the financial turmoil on Nordea’s profits was limited. However, the 
group’s Danish arm has been heavily hit, due to the local real estate crisis. The bank was 
able to attract additional capital without government support by issuing in February 2009 
€2.5 billion of new shares.130 Despite the crisis, Nordea bought the troubled Fiona bank 
for €121 million, which was part of the state aid agreement for the small Danish bank.131  
 
Bank: Barclays PLC   Country: United Kingdom 
Activities.  The listed financial group Barclays has substantial retail, commercial and 
investment banking activities, mainly located in the United Kingdom, United States and 
South Africa.132 Nevertheless, trading remains the bank’s primary area of activity which 
is mainly in the capital markets and derivatives transactions.133 Barclays’s retail banking 
consists largely of credit card and consumer lending business; in 2009 this income was 
equal to the total retail income in the UK.  
Crisis. Despite substantial write-downs in its credit portfolio, Barclays remained 
profitable during the financial crisis.134,135 This is mainly due to one-off gains on sales of 
subsidiaries and gains on acquisitions, such as its £ 2.3 billion (€2.9 billion) before-tax 
earnings from the acquisition of Lehman Brothers’ North American businesses in 
September 2008. In October 2008, in response to strengthened regulatory capital 
requirements, Barclays issued new shares and mandatory convertible bonds for a total 
amount of £ 7.3 billion (€9 billion). In 2009, the bank increased its capital position further 
by retaining gains from the sale of several subsidiaries, including a £ 1.5 billion (€1.7 
billion) net gain from the sale of iShares to CVC and a £ 5.3 billion (€6 billion) from the 
                                                                                                                                       
the upcoming years.  
130 Nordea Bank, “Nordea has a strong capital base and will not apply for hybrid loans from the 
Danish state”, press release, 24 June 2009 (http://hugin.info/1151/R/1324633/311177.pdf). 
131 State Aid N 560/2009 – Denmark Aid for the liquidation of Fionia Bank, C(2010) 7427 final, 25 
October 2010 (http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/comp-2009/n560-09.pdf).  
132 In 2010, Barclays settled a dispute with US authorities for $300 million (€225 million). The US 
authorities investigated the compliance of Barclays with US sanctions and payment practices, i.e. 
the bank processed between 2000 and 2007 payments of countries, persons and entities subject to 
economic sanctions.  
133 The bank was, for instance, the fifth largest global issuer of collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) at the time the US housing bubble burst. For more information, see Reuters, Global ABS 
CDO issuance 2006 and 2007, Reuters, 20 April 2010 
(http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/10/04/GLB_GCDOV0410.gif). 
134 In 2009 the bank even recorded a record net income of £10.3 billion, mainly due to capital gains 
on acquisitions.  
135 After Barclays lost the bidding war for ABN Amro of the Fortis, Santander and RBS 
consortium in 2007, the bank continued its £2.5 billion share buyback programme. This is to 
minimise the effect of the shares issued to China Development Bank and Singaporean Temasek 
Holdings used to improve its ABN Amro take-over bid (Barclays PLC, “Withdrawal of offer for 
ABN Amro and restart of buyback programme”, press release, 5 October 2007.) 98 | APPENDIX III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SAMPLED BANKS 
sale of Barclays Global Investors (BGI) to BlackRock. Meanwhile, the bank acquired 
smaller businesses, primarily credit card companies.136  
 
Bank: HSBC Holdings plc   Country: United Kingdom 
Activities.  The listed banking group HSBC Holdings has substantial personal and 
corporate financing activities in Europe (United Kingdom), Asia (Hong Kong, China), 
and North America (United States). In recent years, HSBC broadened its global reach 
further by expanding in several Eastern Asian emerging markets. The bank’s broad 
international retail network serves as its primary source of funding, representing nearly 
half of its balance sheet. In turn, trading and interbank activities are much less dominant, 
explaining the bank’s assignment to the retail banking model in the cluster analysis.  
Crisis. HSBC Holdings reported lower profits during the financial crisis, mainly due to 
write-downs on credit securities and the impairment of goodwill from the acquisition of 
Personal Financial Services North America, leading to a recognised loss of $10.6 billion 
(€7 billion) in 2008. In addition, the bank also lost about $1.1 billion (€0.8 billion) due to its 
trading losses in relation with the Madoff fraud case.137 These losses were partially offset 
by one-off capital gains on the sale of subsidiaries, including part of the group’s French 
network to Banque Populaire in 2008 ($2.4 billion, or €1.6 billion). To strengthen its 
capital base further, HSBC Holdings issued $17.8 billion (€13 billion) new shares in April 
2009. 
 
Bank: Lloyds Banking Group plc   Country: United Kingdom 
Activities. Lloyds banking group was created in January 2009 after the acquisition of 
HBOS. The group’s operations focus predominantly on the retail market in the UK. The 
listed group also has wholesale banking, insurance, and asset management activities. 
Non-UK activities include offshore activities in the Crown Dependencies and 
Switzerland, retail business in Ireland, corporate finance activities in Australia as well as 
smaller European retail arms.138 
State aid. In 2009, the banking group received state aid to cover its heavy losses, mainly 
due to its acquisition of the troubled HBOS, which had been active in the structured 
finance market and which relied heavily on wholesale funding.139 In January 2009, the 
                                                      
136 These acquisitions include the Russian Expobank, Indonesian PT Bank Akita, Citi’s Portugal 
credit card business, UK Standard Life Bank and eGG’S credit cards UK. 
137 HSBC also faces a $6.6 billion (€4.5 billion) lawsuit for its potential involvement in the Madoff 
case, initiated by the court-appointed trustee Irving Picard, who was charged with recovering 
money for the victims. For more information, see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2428b572-016c-
11e0-9b29-00144feab49a.html.  
138  State aid No. N 428/2009 – United Kingdom Restructuring of Lloyds Banking Group, 
C(2009)9087 final, 18 November 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/comp-2009/n428-
09.pdf). 
139 Due to the financial crisis the Lloyds Banking Group plc reported substantially lower profits in 
2008 and 2010. In 2009 the bank reported higher profits, due to a net gain of £ 11.2 billion on the 
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Lloyds Banking Group received a capital injection of £ 17 billion (£ 13 billion ordinary 
shares and £ 4 billion preference shares). In return, the government received a stake of 
43.5% in the group. In March 2009, the preference shares were redeemed by the issuance 
of ordinary shares by the group. The government bought 43.5% of these new shares. 
Lloyds strengthened its capital further in November 2009 by issuing £ 22.5 billion (€25 
billion) of capital, which allowed it to opt out of the UK Assets Protection Scheme for its 
bad loan portfolio, worth £ 260 billion (€290 billion). Once again, the UK government 
bought 43.5% of the £ 13.5 billion (€15 billion) of issued ordinary shares. In addition to 
these capital injections in which the state took a predominant part, the group received 
liquidity support under the UK Credit Guarantee Scheme and the Special Liquidity 
Scheme of the Bank of England.140  
Restructuring. The state aid was approved by the Commission under the condition that 
Lloyds would restructure its activities before 2014. The restructuring package contains 
measures to increase the viability of the bank’s businesses by reducing its risk profile, 
diminishing its reliance on capital market funding, and increasing the operational 
efficiency of the integrated HBOS activities. To increase competition in the UK retail 
market, the bank has to carve out and sell a full operational bank with over 600 branches 
in the UK.141  
 
Bank: The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (RBS)   Country: United Kingdom 
Activities. The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc (RBS) is active in the retail markets, 
corporate financing and capital markets. The retail banking activities are mainly located 
i n  t h e  U n i t e d  K i n g d o m  ( R o y a l  B a n k  o f  S c otland and NatWest), the United States 
(Citizens), and Ireland (Ulster Bank). The international investment banking activities 
grew fast in the years preceding the crisis due to numerous acquisitions, including a 
partnership with Bank of China (2005), acquisitions of Charter One in the US (2004) and 
ABN Amro (2007).142 The group’s acquisition of ABN Amro’s wholesale and trading 
activities is the principal driver of the bank’s transition from a retail bank in 2006 into an 
investment bank in 2008 and 2009, according to the categorisation from the cluster 
                                                                                                                                       
acquisition of HBOS and capital gains of £1.5 billion. The income figures included from 2007 to 
2010 substantially higher impairment charges. A larger part of these impairments originate from 
the loan portfolios in Ireland and Australia.  
140 Lloyds banking group received at the end of 2010 liquidity support from governments and 
central banks for a total amount of £96.6 billion (End 2009: £157.2 billion). The current issued Bank 
of England government liquidity facilities, UK Special Liquidity Scheme facility and UK Credit 
Guarantee Scheme, will be maturing in 2012. By March 2011 the bank did not receive liquidity 
support from ECB or FED.  
141 In March 2011, the bank announced to start an auction to sell the branches. For more, see 
Lloyds Banking Group, “Lloyds Banking Group appoints advisers for project Verde”, press 
release, 28 March 2011 (http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media/pdfs/lbg/2011/ 
Verde_Release280311.pdf).  
142 State aid No N 422/2009 and N 621/2009 - United Kingdom Restructuring of Royal Bank of 
Scotland following its recapitalisation by the State and its participation in the Asset Protection 
Scheme, C(2009)10112 final, 14 December 2009 (http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/state_aids/comp-
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analysis.  
State aid. During the financial crisis, the group received extensive liquidity and capital 
support from the UK government and the central bank. RBS needed the support mainly 
because of its high dependency on wholesale funding, higher credit risks, and losses on 
structured assets as well as those arising from the acquisition of ABN Amro.143 In 2008, 
the group tried to restore its capital base without government help by issuing £12 billion 
(€15 billion) of ordinary shares. In addition, the bank sold Angel Trains Group (net gain 
£570 million, or €700 million) as well as its stakes in Tesco Personal Finance JV (net gain 
£500 million, or €600 million).144 Despite these measures the state had to intervene in 
December 2008 by acquiring £15 billion (€19 billion) of new ordinary shares and £5 billion 
(€6 billion) of preference shares, which were converted into ordinary shares in 2009. In 
2009, additional state aid measures were deployed, amounting to £25.5 billion (€29 
billion) worth of non-voting shares and £ 8 billion (€9 billion) worth of contingent non-
voting shares in 2009. In same year, the bank took part in the Asset Protection Scheme 
(APS) to offload £282 billion (€310 billion) of bad assets, with a haircut of £60 billion (€66 
billion). As a result of these measures, the state owned a combined 70.3% of the voting 
rights and 84.4% of the economic interest by December 2010.145  
Restructuring. In line with the provisions of the Commission’s approval of state aid, RBS 
will have to concentrate more on its core banking activities in UK retail and corporate 
markets, reducing its reliance on wholesale funding as well as global banking activities146 
by 2013. The retail and corporate banking activities outside the UK, Ireland and US and 
part of the wholesale activities will be sold or ceased. In addition, the group agreed to sell 
part of its UK branch network to Banco Santander (net gain £ 350 million, or €400 million) 
to increase competition on the UK market.147 
                                                      
143 Since the burst of the financial crisis in 2007, the Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc had three 
consecutive years of negative annual net incomes, mainly because of rising risk costs and high 
write downs on goodwill, e.g. in 2008 the group wrote down £7.7 billion on the goodwill created 
by the takeover of ABN Amro, £4.4 billion on Charter One and £2.7 billion on NatWest.  
144 Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, “RBS to sell 50% shareholding in Tesco Personal Finance to 
Tesco”, press release, 28 July 2008 (http://www.rbs.com/media/news/press-releases/2008-
press-releases/2008-07-28rbs-to-sell-50-share.ashx).  
145 The RBS group also used liquidity facilities of the government and central banks, e.g. RBS 
issued bonds under the UK Credit Guarantee Scheme.  
146 The Global Banking division has to reduce its risk-weighted assets by about 45% to £150 
billion.  
147 Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, “RBS agrees to sell its RBS England and Wales and NatWest 
Scotland branch based business to Santander UK plc”, press release, 4 Augustus 2010 
(http://www.rbs.com/media/news/press-releases/2010-press-releases/2010-08-04-sale-of-
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APPENDIX IV. RETURN ON ASSETS (%) 
Nr.  Name  Country  2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Dexia  SA  BE  0.60  0.48  -0.60  0.24 
2  KBC Group NV  BE  1.41  1.23  -0.85  -0.86 
3 Bayerische  Landesbank  DE  0.39  0.04  -1.16  -0.68 
4 Commerzbank  Group  DE  0.39  0.41  -0.07  -0.55 
5 Deutsche  Bank  AG  DE  0.53  0.43  -0.38  0.24 
6  DZ Bank AG  DE  0.49  0.25  -0.36  0.22 
7  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  DE  0.35  0.15  -0.53  -1.49 
8 Landesbank  Baden-Württemberg  DE  0.31  0.08  -0.59  -0.29 
9 WestLB  AG  DE  0.35  -0.52  0.01  -0.21 
10  Dankse  Bank  Group  DK  0.68 0.58 0.06 0.15 
11  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   ES  1.71  1.69  1.28  1.07 
12  Banco Santander S.A.  ES  1.08  1.20  1.03  0.95 
13  BNP  Paribas  FR  0.73 0.65 0.19 0.44 
14 BPCE  Group  FR  ..  ..  ..  -0.04 
.. Banque  Populaire  Group  FR  1.44  0.42  -0.07  .. 
.. Groupe  Caisse  d'Epargne  FR  0.97  0.29  -0.43  .. 
15  Crédit  Agricole  S.A.  FR  0.54 0.34 0.07 0.10 
16  Société  Générale  FR  0.84 0.18 0.35 0.08 
17  Intesa Sanpaolo Group  IT  ..  1.55  0.33  0.58 
..  Banca  Intesa  IT  1.34  .. .. .. 
..  Sanpaolo  IMI  IT  1.07  .. .. .. 
18  UniCredit  Group  IT  1.00 0.90 0.48 0.31 
19  ABN Amro Holding N.V.  NL  0.31  0.17  0.15  -1.03 
20  ING Group N.V.  NL  0.81  0.84  -0.11  -0.13 
21  Rabobank  Group  NL  0.49 0.53 0.47 0.43 
22  Nordea Bank AB  SE  1.10  1.00  0.72  0.61 
23  Barclays  PLC  UK  0.72 0.58 0.30 0.84 
24  HSBC  Holdings  plc  UK  1.19 1.03 0.37 0.30 
25  Lloyds Banking Group plc  UK  1.24  1.13  0.17  0.10 
26  The Royal Bank of Scotland plc  UK  1.05  0.52  -1.53  -0.16 
Retail banks  1.06 1.01 0.32 0.26 
Investment banks  0.66 0.22 -0.09 0.07 
   Wholesale banks     0.61 0.30 -0.42  -0.37 
   TOTAL     0.83 0.58 -0.06  -0.02 
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APPENDIX V. RETURN ON EQUITY (%) 
Nr.  Name  Country  2006 2007 2008 2009 
1  Dexia  SA  BE  18.5 17.6 -69.0 11.7 
2  KBC Group NV  BE  24.9  23.7  -19.6  -16.2 
3 Bayerische  Landesbank  DE  10.7  1.3  -44.1  -16.3 
4 Commerzbank  Group  DE  15.6  15.5  -2.0  -17.5 
5  Deutsche  Bank  AG  DE  25.4 23.6 -18.0 13.7 
6  DZ Bank AG  DE  19.1  9.7  -18.4  8.2 
7  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  DE  16.6  9.7  147.3  -116.6 
8 Landesbank  Baden-Württemberg  DE  12.5  3.3  -43.5  -11.6 
9 WestLB  AG  DE  14.9  -33.9  0.7  -13.5 
10 Dankse  Bank  Group  DK  19.4  18.5  2.3  4.7 
11  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   ES  31.5  30.4  25.9  18.6 
12  Banco Santander S.A.  ES  19.1  19.1  18.1  14.7 
13 BNP  Paribas  FR  19.3  18.6  6.7  11.2 
14  BPCE  Group  FR  .. .. ..  -0.8 
.. Banque  Populaire  Group  FR  22.4  7.1  -1.5  .. 
.. Groupe  Caisse  d'Epargne  FR  25.6  7.8  -15.2  .. 
15 Crédit  Agricole  S.A.  FR  17.5  10.4  2.5  2.9 
16 Société  Générale  FR  24.2  6.0  9.8  1.7 
17  Intesa Sanpaolo Group  IT  ..  17.2  4.1  6.7 
.. Banca  Intesa  IT  21.9  ..  ..  .. 
.. Sanpaolo  IMI  IT  23.8  ..  ..  .. 
18 UniCredit  Group  IT  20.4  15.0  8.6  4.6 
19  ABN Amro Holding N.V.  NL  11.9  5.5  5.9  -25.5 
20  ING Group N.V.  NL  24.1  27.9  -5.1  -3.8 
21  Rabobank  Group  NL  9.2 9.7 8.5 6.8 
22  Nordea Bank AB  SE  24.9  22.6  19.1  13.7 
23  Barclays  PLC  UK  26.1 21.8 12.8 19.9 
24 HSBC  Holdings  plc  UK  19.2  17.9  9.3  7.1 
25  Lloyds Banking Group plc  UK  36.9  32.2  7.8  2.4 
26  The Royal Bank of Scotland plc  UK  20.2  10.8  -45.6  -2.8 
Retail banks  22.4 20.2  6.5  4.4 
Investment banks  21.1 3.1 -1.6 -0.2 
   Wholesale banks     17.6 9.3 -4.9  -18.5 
   TOTAL     20.5 12.8  0.2  -5.2 
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APPENDIX VI. EQUITY RATIO (%) 
Nr.  Name  Country  2006 2007 2008 2009 
1  Dexia  SA  BE  3.3 2.7 0.9 2.1 
2  KBC Group NV  BE  5.7  5.2  4.3  5.3 
3  Bayerische  Landesbank  DE  3.6 3.1 2.6 4.2 
4  Commerzbank  Group  DE  2.5 2.6 3.2 3.1 
5  Deutsche  Bank  AG  DE  2.1 1.8 2.1 1.7 
6  DZ Bank AG  DE  2.6  2.6  2.0  2.6 
7  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  DE  2.1  1.5  -0.4  1.3 
8  Landesbank  Baden-Württemberg  DE  2.5 2.3 1.4 2.6 
9  WestLB  AG  DE  2.4 1.5 1.3 1.5 
10  Dankse  Bank  Group  DK  3.5 3.1 2.8 3.2 
11  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   ES  5.4  5.6  4.9  5.7 
12  Banco Santander S.A.  ES  5.6  6.3  5.7  6.5 
13  BNP  Paribas  FR  3.8 3.5 2.8 3.9 
14 BPCE  Group  FR  ..  ..  ..  4.6 
.. Banque  Populaire  Group  FR  6.4  5.8  4.9  .. 
.. Groupe  Caisse  d'Epargne  FR  3.8  3.7  2.8  .. 
15  Crédit  Agricole  S.A.  FR  3.1 3.3 2.9 3.3 
16  Société  Générale  FR  3.5 2.9 3.6 4.6 
17  Intesa Sanpaolo Group  IT  ..  9.0  8.1  8.7 
..  Banca  Intesa  IT  6.1  .. .. .. 
..  Sanpaolo  IMI  IT  4.5  .. .. .. 
18  UniCredit  Group  IT  4.9 6.0 5.6 6.8 
19  ABN Amro Holding N.V.  NL  2.6  3.1  2.6  4.0 
20  ING Group N.V.  NL  3.4  3.0  2.2  3.4 
21  Rabobank  Group  NL  5.3 5.5 5.5 6.3 
22  Nordea Bank AB  SE  4.4  4.4  3.8  4.4 
23  Barclays  PLC  UK  2.7 2.6 2.3 4.2 
24  HSBC  Holdings  plc  UK  6.2 5.8 4.0 4.2 
25  Lloyds Banking Group plc  UK  3.3  3.5  2.2  4.3 
26  The Royal Bank of Scotland plc  UK  5.2  4.8  3.4  5.6 
Retail banks  4.8 5.1 4.5 5.3 
Investment banks  3.1 2.7 2.7 3.8 
   Wholesale banks     3.3 3.3 2.2 3.1 
   TOTAL     4.0 3.9 3.2 4.1 104 | 
APPENDIX VII. TIER I RATIO (%) 
Nr.  Name  Country  2006 2007 2008 2009 
1 Dexia  SA  BE  9.8  9.1  10.6  12.3 
2  KBC Group NV  BE  8.7  8.5  9.8  12.0 
3  Bayerische  Landesbank  DE  .. .. .. .. 
4 Commerzbank  Group  DE  6.8  7.0  10.8  8.2 
5 Deutsche  Bank  AG  DE  8.9  8.6  10.1  12.6 
6  DZ Bank AG  DE  ..  ..  ..  .. 
7  Hypo Real Estate Holding AG  DE  7.0  7.0  3.4  7.8 
8  Landesbank  Baden-Württemberg  DE  7.4 8.3 6.9 9.8 
9  WestLB  AG  DE  7.6 5.3 6.4 8.2 
10  Dankse  Bank  Group  DK  8.6 6.4 9.2  14.1 
11  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria   ES  7.8  6.8  7.9  9.4 
12  Banco Santander S.A.  ES  7.4  7.7  ..  .. 
13  BNP  Paribas  FR  7.2 7.0 7.9  10.1 
14  BPCE  Group  FR  .. .. ..  9.1 
.. Banque  Populaire  Group  FR  ..  9.1  7.7  .. 
..  Groupe  Caisse  d'Epargne  FR  .. .. .. .. 
15  Crédit  Agricole  S.A.  FR  4.6 5.4 7.2 7.2 
16  Société  Générale  FR  7.8 5.5 8.2 9.9 
17  Intesa Sanpaolo Group  IT  ..  6.1  6.6  7.8 
.. Banca  Intesa  IT  5.8  ..  ..  .. 
.. Sanpaolo  IMI  IT  5.9  ..  ..  .. 
18  UniCredit  Group  IT  6.6 6.4 6.8 8.6 
19  ABN Amro Holding N.V.  NL  7.9  10.9  10.9  19.9 
20  ING Group N.V.  NL  7.6  7.4  9.3  10.2 
21  Rabobank  Group  NL  10.7 10.7 12.8 13.8 
22  Nordea Bank AB  SE  7.1  7.0  6.9  9.5 
23  Barclays  PLC  UK  6.8 7.4 8.5  12.8 
24  HSBC  Holdings  plc  UK  8.7 8.7 8.3  10.8 
25  Lloyds Banking Group plc  UK  6.5  6.4  6.4  8.1 
26  The Royal Bank of Scotland plc  UK  5.2  6.4  9.6  13.4 
Retail banks  7.4 7.9 8.3  10.2 
Investment banks  7.3 6.3 8.6  10.5 
   Wholesale banks      7.1 7.5 7.7  11.0 
   TOTAL      7.3 7.4 8.2  10.5 
 